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Abstract
We propose a formal model for non-interactive message authentication protocols
(NIMAPs) using two channels and analyze all the attacks that can occur in this
model. Further, we introduce the notion of hybrid-collision resistant (HCR) hash
functions. This leads to a new proposal for a NIMAP based on HCR hash functions.
This protocol is as efficient as the best previous NIMAP while having a very simple
structure and not requiring any long strings to be authenticated ahead of time.
We investigate interactive message authentication protocols (IMAPs) and pro-
pose a new IMAP, based on the existence of interactive-collision resistant (ICR)
hash functions, a new notion of hash function security. The efficient and easy-to-
use structure of our IMAP makes it very practical in real world ad hoc network
scenarios.
We also look at message recognition protocols (MRPs) and prove that there is
a one-to-one correspondence between non-interactive MRPs and digital signature
schemes with message recovery. Further, we look at an existing recognition proto-
col and point out its inability to recover in case of a specific adversarial disruption.
We improve this protocol by suggesting a variant which is equipped with a resyn-
chronization process. Moreover, another variant of the protocol is proposed which
self-recovers in case of an intrusion. Finally, we propose a new design for message
recognition in ad hoc networks which does not make use of hash chains. This new
design uses random passwords that are being refreshed in each session, as opposed
to precomputed elements of a hash chain.
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In this thesis, we focus on using two-channel cryptography to design message
authentication protocols and message recognition protocols suitable for networks
consisting of devices with limited resources. In particular, we look at non-interactive
message authentication protocols (NIMAPs), interactive message authentication
protocols (IMAPs), and message recognition protocols (MRPs). Previous protocols
are reviewed and some are improved; new protocols are proposed; security proofs
are provided; and advantages of the new protocols are highlighted.
Standard models of public-key cryptography and secret-key cryptography have
addressed the problem of message authentication and message recognition by means
of assuming availability of public-key infrastructures or secure channels. In some
scenarios, however, assuming the traditional settings of public-key and secret-key
cryptography might not be practical and, indeed, using these techniques may be
very costly. Mobile ad hoc networks (MANET), wireless sensor networks (WSN),
and pervasive networks in general are examples of scenarios in which traditional
cryptographic protocols may not be suitable, or not even possible, to implement.
1
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§1.1. Two-channel Cryptography and Applications
In search of a solution to this problem, researchers realized that when the devices
come in close geographic proximity of each other, it is possible to make use of a
manual channel, as well as the usual wireless channel. Instances of the manual
channel are typically more expensive to operate compared to the wireless channel.
However, they provide some level of security. For example, the channel may provide
authenticity of short messages, but may not be confidential. The aim is to employ
a (broadband and insecure) wireless channel and a (somewhat secure and narrow-
band) manual channel at the same time and attain a security objective, message
authentication for instance. This motivated the term two-channel cryptography.
In 1984, Rivest and Shamir [RS84] first proposed incorporating human par-
ticipation in authentication protocols. However, this idea did not receive serious
attention from researchers until very recently. Rivest and Shamir proposed using
the human voice in authentication protocols and they designed a protocol for two
parties who want to authenticate a key under the assumption that no trusted third
parties exist, but where the two parties can recognize each other’s voices. They
motivate the setting by the following scenario. Two company executives who can
recognize each other’s voices but who do not have each other’s public keys want
to exchange keys via a scrambled telephone line. They begin by exchanging their
public keys. Then, each user chooses a message and uses the other party’s public
key to encrypt the message. The first half of the bits of the resulting ciphertexts
are exchanged. The parties acknowledge receiving the first half of the ciphertexts
on the phone. Then, the second half of the bits are sent. While all the steps of the
protocol are handled automatically, the two executives are aware of each other’s
unscrambled voice and use this knowledge to verify the authenticity of the strings.
1.1 Two-channel Cryptography and Applications
We first describe the communication model of two-channel cryptography, where it is
assumed that two channels are accessible for communication: an insecure broadband
channel, denoted by “→”, and an authenticated narrow-band channel, denoted by
“⇒”. Communication over the authenticated channel is usually more expensive and
less convenient. Hence, the messages sent over the authenticated channel are usually
much shorter than those sent over the insecure channel. The goal of two-channel
cryptography is, then, to achieve a certain cryptographic objective by means of the
two channels, while optimizing the cost.
In some scenarios, the narrow-band authenticated channel may be accessible all
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the time, whereas in other scenarios, it may accessible only during the initialization
phase. An insecure wireless channel is an example of the broadband channel. The
narrow-band channel is usually used to send a short string. Instances of the narrow-
band channel include voice-over-internet-protocol (VoIP), data imprinting or data
comparison by a user, near field communication (NFC), infrared (IR), laser, or
visible light between two devices.
The assumed adversarial capabilities may vary depending on the particular sce-
nario. However, the following are common assumptions on what an adversary can
and cannot do in two-channel cryptography.
• The adversary has full control over the broadband channel. That is, the
adversary can listen to any messages sent over the broadband channel, modify
the messages sent via this channel, stall a message from being delivered, and
insert a new message into this channel at any time.
• On the other hand, we assume that the adversary’s control over the authen-
ticated channel is limited. In particular, the adversary cannot modify the
information transmitted over the authenticated channel, i.e., data integrity is
ensured in this channel. However, it may be possible to read, delay or remove
a message from this channel.
Moreover, the authenticated channel is equipped with user authenticating fea-
tures such that the recipient of the information can be sure about who sent it. In
other words, an adversary cannot initiate a flow over this channel. On the other
hand, the adversary, for instance in case of human VoIP, may be able to replay a
previous flow sent through this channel. However, replaying a previous flow sent
by Alice to Bob is not going to help Eve, when she wants to deceive another party,
Charlie. That is, when Bob receives an authenticated flow, he can check if he was
the intended recipient or not. In other realizations of the narrow-band channel,
however, replaying an authenticated flow may not be possible.
Two-channel cryptography techniques have several applications, especially in
constrained environments where secure channels or trusted infrastructures do not
exist or are very costly to provide. Moreover, these techniques are useful in networks
that are composed of constrained devices which cannot handle heavy computations
such as public-key computations.
With new technological advancements in miniaturizing devices and the emerging
smart homes and buildings projects [CEEC08], the problem of designing light-
weight cryptographic protocols for low-end devices has attracted a lot of attention
3
Chapter 1. Introduction
§1.2. Message Authentication in Ad hoc Networks
both in the academic community and in industry. In scenarios such as personal
area networks (PAN) [GN04] and telemedicine (remote health care where medical
personnel can monitor the patients from a distance) [Dem04], where the devices
are naturally attended by users, the idea of employing the manual channel is even
more appealing. This approach is especially attractive when it enables researchers
to design more cost-efficient and easy-to-implement protocols.
Another important application is disaster recovery, when a trusted infrastruc-
ture is compromised. The use of two-channel cryptography allows for temporary,
yet speedy, relief before the infrastructure is fully recovered. Full recovery usually
takes a lot longer and security providers need to be vigilant in the meantime.
1.2 Message Authentication in Ad hoc Networks
The problem of authentication is an important aspect of secure communication.
Typically, communicating parties would like to be assured of the authenticity of
information they obtain via potentially insecure channels.
An ad hoc network is a network where some of the users are part of the network
only for a short period of time. For practical reasons, it should be possible to quickly
add new users to an ad hoc network. In this network, like any other network, it is
desirable to have message authentication. However, assuming traditional settings
might not be practical. For example, a public-key infrastructure may not exist;
secure channels might not be present; communication bandwidth may be severely
limited. Consider the following scenario presented in the literature [BSSW02] which
motives this setting: a traveller in an airport lounge would like to print a sensitive
document from his or her laptop to one of the many printers set up in the airport
lounge. The lounge does not have a secure universal naming infrastructure for
the printers. The traveller wants to choose a particular printer and make sure the
document gets printed by that particular printer (and no other printer), using the
insecure wireless channel. The traveller’s laptop and a printer need to be securely
introduced while there is no public-key infrastructure or secure channel available.
In order to overcome these difficulties in an ad hoc network and still be able to
provide message authentication, one can employ two-channel cryptographic tech-
niques when designing protocols [BSSW02, GN04, GMN04, Hoe04, LN06, LAN05,
NSS06, PV06, RWSN07, SA99, Vau05, WSN08].
We focus on message authentication protocols which deploy both narrow-band
and broadband channels between a claimant Alice and a verifier Bob. Alice chooses
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a message M ∈ M, where M denotes the space of all acceptable messages, and
sends it to Bob using a NIMAP or an IMAP. At the end of the protocol, Bob either
outputs (Alice, M ′), where M ′ ∈ M, or he rejects. In the absence of an active
adversary, denoted as Eve, the message M sent from Alice should be recovered by
Bob, making him accept and output (Alice, M). This message M could be a key
that is going to be used for further communication. Eve’s goal is to make Bob
accept a message M ′ along with the identity of Alice, when Alice has never sent
M ′.
The attack model assumed in this context is the adaptive chosen plaintext attack
(ACPA) model [GMR88]. The ACPA model consists of two phases: an information
gathering stage and a deception stage. In the information gathering stage, Eve
adaptively makes Alice send M1,M2, . . . ,Mq to Bob, where q is an integer termed
the querying complexity. In the deception stage, Eve sends a single message M ′,
along with the identity of Alice, to Bob, where M ′ /∈ {M1,M2, . . . ,Mq}. Eve
is successful if Bob accepts M ′ along with Alice’s identity. The computational
complexity of the adversary before the deception starts, i.e. during the information
gathering stage, is referred to as offline computational complexity, whereas online
computational complexity refers to the computational complexity of the adversary
during the deception stage.
1.3 Message Recognition in Ad Hoc Networks
Message recognition in ad hoc networks has been motivated in the literature by the
following example [LZWW05]. Consider Alice and Bob, two strangers who meet
at a party for the first time. They make a bet before they leave the party. Later,
the outcome turns out to be in favour of Alice, and a few days later, Bob receives
a message claiming to be sent from Alice. The message includes a bank account
number and asks Bob to deposit Alice’s prize to that bank account. How can Bob
be assured that this message was indeed sent from the entity who introduced herself
as “Alice” in the party? That is, Bob wants to recognize “Alice”, whoever she was,
or a message that was sent from her. This problem has a solution if Alice and Bob
exchange some information, which is not necessarily secret, at the party.
Alternatively, let Alice and Bob be two small devices in a hostile environment.
They have previously “met” in an environment that allowed them to send authen-
ticated messages, but the messages were not confidential. Later, Alice wants Bob
to recognize her or recognize the messages sent from her to Bob. There is an ad-
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versary, Eve, who is trying to make Bob recognize Eve as Alice, or accept messages
from Eve as sent from Alice, where Alice has never sent those messages. Note that
we do not consider replay attacks as threats. A message recognition protocol is
considered to be secure if Eve’s attempts are detected by Alice or Bob.
Recall the following widely used definitions of entity authentication and message
authentication from the Handbook of Applied Cryptography [MvOV96]. Entity
authentication is a security notion which assures the identity of a participating
party to a second party. Message authentication, on the other hand, provides data
origin authentication with respect to the original message source and does not have
to provide uniqueness and timeliness.
We now define entity recognition, a security notion related to the entity authen-
tication. Entity recognition is a weaker security notion than entity authentication;
entity recognition refers to the process where two parties meet initially and one
party can be assured in future conversations that it is communicating with the
same second party. It should also provide uniqueness, that is, the corroborative
evidence obtained in this process should uniquely correspond to the identity of the
claimant. It should also assure timeliness, that is, to provide verifiable evidence
that the claimant is active at the time of, or immediately before, the evidence was
obtained.
Message recognition is a weaker security notion than message authentication
and it provides data integrity with respect to the data origin. It ensures that the
entity who sent the message is the same in future conversations. However, it does
not have to provide uniqueness or timeliness.
Public-key techniques such as digital signature schemes solve the problem of
recognition easily. However, using these techniques in some scenarios may be very
costly. For instance, there may be no pre-deployed authentic information accessible.
Also, we may not be able to assume trusted third parties are available to form a
trusted infrastructure. Further, we may be dealing with devices with very low
computational power where public-key computations are too heavy to be carried
out. On the other hand, secret-key techniques require the existence of a secure
channel where the secret keys can be transmitted confidentially. In a dynamic
environment with no infrastructure, this assumption may not be easily realized.
The question is which security objectives can be achieved among devices with
low-computational power in an environment where no pre-established authentic
information exists and without the presence of a trusted third party. Weimerskirch
and Westhoff [WW03] argued that in such an environment, achieving authentication
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is not possible and that all one can achieve is recognition security. Further, it
is noted [WW03] that recognition is often all that is required in most dynamic
environments. Hence, the weaker security goals of entity and message recognition
are often pursued [ABC+98, HWGW05, LZWW07, LZWW08, Mit03, WW03].
There are two communication channels considered in the setting of recognition
protocols: an insecure broadband channel which is available all the time, and an
authenticated non-confidential narrow-band channel, which is only accessible once,
at the very beginning of the protocol. That is, the narrow-band channel is used
for the initial session between two users and later sessions occur over the insecure
channel.
1.4 Interactive versus Non-interactive Protocols
A message authentication protocol may or may not require online interaction with
Bob. There are non-interactive and interactive message authentication protocols
that have been considered in the literature [BSSW02, GN04, GMN04, Hoe04, LN06,
LAN05, NSS06, PV06, RWSN07, SA99, Vau05, WSN08].
In a NIMAP, all flows are initiated by Alice. She sends some information over
the broadband channel and some information over the narrow-band channel. Since
there is no flow being initiated by Bob, the order in which Alice’s flows are sent is
irrelevant. As a result, we can combine all flows sent over the broadband channel
into one single flow and, similarly, we can combine all flows sent over the narrow-
band channel into one single flow. Hence, without loss of generality, we obtain a
typical flow structure of a NIMAP as depicted in Fig. 1.1.
Alice Bob




Output (Alice, M ′) or reject.
Figure 1.1: A Schematic NIMAP
On the other hand, the flow structure of an IMAP can be more complicated.
There is at least one flow initiated by Bob and, hence, the order in which flows are
initiated matters. There may be more than one narrow-band flow. The authenti-
cated channel may be bidirectional which means Bob can initiate a flow over the
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narrow-band channel as well. Illustrated in Fig. 1.2 is a possible flow structure of
an IMAP. In this particular flow structure, the first flow is initiated by Alice on the
broadband channel which is followed by a response from Bob on the same channel.
Then, Alice sends one more flow over the broadband channel and her authenticated
flow over the narrow-band channel.
Alice Bob





===⇒ Output (Alice, M ′) or reject.
Figure 1.2: A Sample Schematic IMAP
NIMAPs are particularly interesting because they do not require the verifier to
be online. On the other hand, interaction sometimes allows for more efficient pro-
tocols. Furthermore, some objectives may not be achievable in the non-interactive
setting, but can be realized in an interactive setting.
1.5 Computational versus Unconditional Security
In the unconditional security setting, the adversary is assumed to have unlimited
computational resources. In the computational security setting, on the other hand,
the computational power of the adversary is bounded (typically, it is assumed to
be polynomial-time, as a function of a certain security parameter). Moreover,
the querying complexity of the adversary is also bounded in the computational
security settings. In order for a protocol to be considered secure, the best currently-
known methods to defeat a system or protocol should exceed the computational
resources of the adversary by a comfortable margin. In case of computationally
secure NIMAPs, IMAPs, or MRPs, a successful adversary is reduced (in the sense
of a Turing reduction) to an attacker against a well-known system or problem which
is proven, or widely believed, to be secure.
1.6 Contributions of this Thesis
There have been many recent papers written on the topic of authentication [BSSW02,
GN04, GMN04, Hoe04, LN06, LAN05, NSS06, PV06, RWSN07, SA99, Vau05,
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WSN08] or recognition [ABC+98, HWGW05, LZWW05, LZWW07, LZWW08,
Mit03, WW03] for low-end devices in constrained environments where a low-bandwidth
authenticated channel is accessible. We analyze all the existing protocols in this
context and point out some of their shortcomings. We also improve some existing
protocols, for example by proposing new and more efficient protocols which are
based on fewer security assumptions, and by providing a general framework, where
possible, to enable a more unified approach to analyzing such protocols.
In the first part of this dissertation, we examine the topic of message authen-
tication protocols in ad hoc networks. Previous interactive and non-interactive
protocols from the literature are fully analyzed. In Chapter 2, we describe a formal
model for NIMAPs using two channels, and analyze the attacks that can occur in
this model. The attack model considered is strong and a scheme that is proved
secure in this model does not require authenticated channels that have any unusual
properties. Further, the idea of hybrid-collision resistant (HCR) hash functions
is introduced and analyzed. This leads to a new proposal [MS07] for a NIMAP
based on HCR hash functions. This protocol is considered in the computational
security setting and it is as efficient as the best previous computationally secure
NIMAP while having a very simple structure and not requiring any long strings to
be authenticated ahead of time. Finally, we provide a new proof of non-existence of
nontrivial unconditionally secure NIMAPs. This proof consists of a combinatorial
counting argument and is much shorter than the previous proof [WSN08].
In Chapter 3, we investigate IMAPs and present a new computationally secure
IMAP [MS08a], based on the existence of interactive-collision resistant (ICR) hash
functions, a new notion of hash function security. The security of this IMAP is
based on the computational assumption that ICR hash functions exist. It performs
better than other message authentication protocols that are based on computational
assumptions. That is, while achieving the same level of security, the amount of
information sent over the authenticated channel in our IMAP is smaller. The
efficient and easy-to-use structure of our IMAP makes it very practical in real world
ad hoc network scenarios. Finally, we propose a generalization of an unconditionally
secure IMAP. We give sufficient conditions for such an IMAP to be secure.
The second part of the dissertation is devoted to examining the problem of
message recognition. In Chapter 4, we prove that there is a one-to-one correspon-
dence between non-interactive MRPs and digital signature schemes with message
recovery. Further, we improve the best existing recognition protocol due to Lucks
et al. [LZWW05] by suggesting a variant [MS08c] to overcome a certain shortcom-
ing. In particular, in case of communication failure or adversarial disruption, the
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Lucks et al. protocol was not equipped with a practical resynchronization process
and therefore it could fail to resume. We propose a new variant of this protocol
[MS08c] that is equipped with a separate resynchronization technique that allows
users to resynchronize whenever they wish or when they suspect an intrusion has
taken place. Further, we present another variant of the protocol [GMS08], which
“self-recovers” in case of an intrusion; it does not need a separate resynchronization
process.
Previous recognition proposals in the literature were based on the idea of ex-
changing values of a hash chain [HWGW05, LZWW05, WW03]. In particular,
each pair of users wishing to communicate required a separate pair of hash chains,
which puts a relatively heavy memory requirement on low-end devices such as sensor
motes, (nodes in a wireless sensor network). Furthermore, the security assumptions
for this protocol depend on the number of sessions the protocol has been executed,
which gives rise to some undesirable security constraints.
We propose a new design for message recognition [MS08b] in ad hoc networks
and explain the advantages of using this new design as compared to previous al-
ternatives. Our proposed recognition protocol does not make use of hash chains.
Instead, the keys used in this protocol are chosen at random in each session. As
a result, we no longer require the low-end devices to save values of a hash chain
in their memories, thus relaxing the memory requirements. Moreover, the keys are
independent of one another and are refreshed in each session. This can be done
an arbitrary number of times, so we do not need to fix the total number of times
the protocol can be executed. As the passwords corresponding to each session are
chosen at random and are independent of one another, we do not need to consider
assumptions that depend on the number of sessions the protocol is executed. Con-
sequently, the security does not weaken as the protocol is executed repeatedly over
time. Last but not least, we provide a practical procedure for resynchronization in
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In this chapter, we consider the problem of non-interactive message authen-
tication using two-channel cryptography: an insecure broadband channel and an
authenticated narrow-band channel. This problem has been considered in the con-
text of ad hoc networks, where it is assumed that there is neither a secret key
shared among the two parties, nor a public-key infrastructure in place. The model
we consider is described in detail in the literature [GN04, GMN04]. Two small
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devices wish to establish a secure key in an environment where no public-key in-
frastructure exists. The two devices can communicate over an insecure broadband
network. Also available is an authenticated narrow-band channel. This channel
might be based on information transmitted by human beings, e.g., a short string
that is read from one device and copied to the other device. The short string is
used to help to authenticate the information sent over the wide-band channel.
In Section 2.1, we present a formal framework [MS07] for protocols of this type,
termed as General Non-Interactive Message Authentication Protocol (GNIMAP).
When discussing the security of GNIMAP, we prove that given that a Binding Game
is hard to win for an adversary with certain properties, GNIMAP is computationally
secure. One can use this framework to analyze and compare particular instances
of a Non-Interactive Message Authentication Protocol (NIMAP) in a more unified
and consistent approach.
We continue in Section 2.2 by briefly examining the previous NIMAPs available
in the literature. We look at the performance and security of these protocols with
respect to our general framework.
This chapter is continued by presenting a new NIMAP [MS07] which is as ef-
ficient as the best previous NIMAPs, while it benefits from a simpler and easier
to implement structure. The security of our protocol is based on a new property
of hash functions that we introduce, which we name Hybrid-Collision Resistance
(HCR). We analyze the HCR notion in the random oracle model to compare it with
more standard notions of hash function security.
This chapter is concluded by proving that nontrivial unconditionally secure
NIMAPs do not exist. Wang and Safavi-Naini [WSN08] first proved this nonex-
istence result using probability distribution arguments. We prove the same result
using a simple counting argument which is much shorter.
2.1 General Framework: GNIMAP
We consider a non-interactive Message Authentication Protocol that employs both
the authenticated and the insecure channel between a claimant Alice and a verifier
Bob. All flows are initiated from Alice and there are a total of two flows, one over
the insecure channel and the other over the authenticated channel. We note that
there is no flow being initiated from Bob and as a result, the order in which these
two flows are being sent over the channels does not matter. Moreover, all other
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scenarios of a non-interactive Message Authentication Protocol involving more than
two flows can be reduced to this scenario. That is, we can simply combine the
flows sent over each type of channel in a single flow. This is not the case in the
interactive setting since the data sent by Alice may depend on some data sent by
Bob in a previous flow, which makes both the order and number of flows important
in analysis.
Let M be the space of messages. In a Message Authentication Protocol, the
claimant Alice chooses a message M ∈ M and sends it to Bob using the protocol.
At the end, Bob either outputs (Alice, M ′), where M ′ ∈M, or he rejects.
Consider a randomized algorithm split : M → M1 × M2 which takes any
message M as input and maps it into a pair (m1,m2), where m1 is shorter than
m2. The reverse procedure is carried out by a deterministic algorithm reconstruct :
M1 ×M2 → M∪ {⊥} which takes a pair (m1,m2) and maps it into a message
M ∈M or a “reject” sign ⊥.
In order to employ the split and reconstruct algorithms in a Message Authen-
tication Protocol, we need them to satisfy the following requirements:
(i) Correctness property: Any message can be uniquely recovered. That is, for
any M ∈M,
reconstruct(split(M)) = M.
(ii) Binding property: The Binding game of Fig. 2.1 is hard. In other words, it
is computationally infeasible to find a message M such that given (m1,m2),
where split(M) = (m1,m2), one can efficiently find an m
′




2) 6= M and reconstruct(m1,m′2) ∈M
with non-negligible probability.
Oscar challenger
Choose M ∈M M−−−−−−−−−→ Compute split(M) = (m1, m2)
m1, m2←−−−−−−−−−
Send m′2.
m′2−−−−−−−−−→ Compute M ′ = reconstruct(m1, m′2).
Oscar wins if M ′ ∈M and M 6= M ′
Figure 2.1: The Binding Game
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Given a pair (m1,m2) corresponding to a message M , it is desirable that for
all m′2 either reconstruct(m1,m
′
2) = M or reconstruct(m1,m
′
2) =⊥ with high
probability. The Binding property ensures that the values m1 and m2 are bound in
such a way that for almost all values of m′2, the pair (m1,m
′
2) corresponds to the
same message M or it is going to be rejected.
We define a pair of algorithms (split, reconstruct) to be (T, ε)-binding if any ad-
versary bounded by a time complexity T wins the Binding game with a probability
of success at most ε.
Now consider the following general non-interactive Message Authentication Pro-
tocol, where the split and reconstruct algorithms satisfy the correctness property
and are (T, ε)-binding. This protocol, abbreviated as GNIMAP, is also depicted in
Fig. 2.2.
Alice Bob
Input (M , Bob)
Compute split(M) = (m1, m2)
m2−−−−→ Receive m′2





Output (Alice, M ′) if M ′ ∈M,
and reject otherwise.
Figure 2.2: General Non-Interactive Message Authentication Protocol
General Non-Interactive Message Authentication Protocol (GNIMAP):
1. On input (M , Bob), Alice computes split(M) = (m1,m2).
2. Alice sends m2 to Bob over the broadband channel.
3. Bob receives m′2.
1
4. Alice sends m1 to Bob over the authenticated channel.
5. Bob receives m1 from Alice.




7. Bob outputs (Alice, M ′) if M ′ ∈M, and rejects otherwise.
1Note that the values that Bob receives on the broadband channel might have been altered by
an adversary. Hence, we use the notation D′ in the receiving end where the data D is transmitted.
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2.1.1 Attack Model
The correctness of the aforementioned GNIMAP is ensured by property (i). In
other words, Bob can successfully recover M from the protocol if all the participants
have been honest and no attack has occurred. In order to analyze the security of
GNIMAP, we need to define an attack model. The adversarial goal and capabilities
are described in the following section.
In the setting of message authentication protocols, the adversarial goal is to
make Bob accept a message M along with the identity of Alice, when he was sup-
posed to reject (that is, when the message M was never sent by Alice to Bob). There
are two main types of attacks to consider: impersonation attacks and substitution
attacks.
In an impersonation attack, the attacker tries to convince Bob that a message
M is sent from Alice, while in fact M was never sent from Alice and the session
has been initiated by the adversary. Figure 2.3 depicts the impersonation attack in
the setting of GNIMAP.
Note that according to our model, the adversary cannot modify the data sent
over the authenticated channel, but he or she can replay them. Hence, the au-





Let m′1 = m1, where Alice
m′1===⇒ Compute M ′ = reconstruct(m′1, m′2).
has sent m1 in a previous flow If M ′ ∈M, then output (Alice, M ′),
reject otherwise.
Figure 2.3: An Impersonation Attack Against GNIMAP
In a substitution attack, on the other hand, Alice initiates a session with Bob
trying to send him a message M . The adversary then substitutes M ′ instead of
M . So, Bob receives M ′ and not M . The adversary may have changed part or all
of M to get M ′. In case of our protocol, the adversary replaces m2 with m
′
2, after
Alice splits M into (m1,m2). The authenticated value m1 cannot be substituted
according to the model.
Note that the message M might have been chosen by the adversary. In other
words, the adversary can make Alice send a message that the adversary has chosen.
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This ability of the adversary may not be considered in all models. We do consider it
in our model since it makes the adversary stronger and results in a stronger model.
Figure 2.4 illustrates a substitution attack against GNIMAP.
Alice Eve Bob
Input (M , Bob)




Let M ′ = reconstruct(m1, m′2).
If M ′ ∈M, output (Alice, M ′),
reject otherwise.
Figure 2.4: A Substitution Attack Against GNIMAP
One could argue that since an attacker has to use a previous flow in an imper-
sonation attack, the attack should not be called an “impersonation”, and should be
called a substitution; see for instance [GN04]. However, we believe that allowing
the adversary to replay previous authenticated flows in an impersonation attack re-
sults in a stronger adversary and, ultimately, a stronger model. Moreover, despite
the fact that the two attack scenarios are equivalent in the non-interactive setting,
they result in two very different attack scenarios in the interactive setting, see for
instance [MS08a].
We consider an adaptive chosen plain-text attack (ACPA) model in our general
setting. Note that the ACPA model is very strong and desirable compared to other
models. An adaptive chosen plaintext attack consists of two stages: an information
gathering stage and a deception stage.
The model presumes that in the information gathering stage, the attacker has
the capability to adaptively choose a number of arbitrary messages Mi, and have
Alice send them to Bob. The attacker then records the communication for further
use. He or she can choose the subsequent messages to be sent by Alice using
the results of the messages already sent. Note that the description of the split
function is known to the adversary. Hence, the adversarial goal is to gather as
many authenticated flows as possible in this stage. In addition, we assume that
the attacker has precomputing capabilities and is able to mount “dictionary”-type
attacks. The information gathering stage of an attack against GNIMAP is depicted
in Fig. 2.5.
Let N denote the set of all messages M sent by Alice to Bob before the start
of deception stage, and the set N denote the set of ordered pairs (m1,m2) sent by
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Alice to Bob over the two channels before the start of deception stage. Note that
the set N includes all messages previously sent by Alice to Bob with or without
the request of the attacker.
Alice Eve Bob
Choose M1 or get it from Eve





Choose Mq or get it from Eve




Figure 2.5: Information Gathering Phase of an Attack
We use the term querying complexity of an adversary to refer to the number
q of messages sent by Alice to Bob during the information gathering stage. On
the other hand, the term offline complexity is used to refer to the computational
complexity T of an adversary.
The deception stage is where the attack occurs. That is, the adversary tries to
achieve his or her goal by making Bob accept a message M along with the identity
of Alice, when he was supposed to reject. The attack is either a substitution or an
impersonation attack.
In case of a substitution attack, Alice is sending a pair (m1,m2) to Bob. The
adversary substitutes m2 with m
′
2 and leaves m1 untouched. Now let M be one
of the messages sent by Alice in the information gathering stage. On the other
hand, consider an impersonation attack where the adversary sends m′2 and replays
m1. Given that M ∈ N , this impersonation attack is equivalent to the substitution
attack that we started with. This fact is illustrated in Fig. 2.6. Hence, without
loss of generality, we only consider impersonation attacks in the deception phase.
In the deception stage, the attacker tries to impersonate Alice by sending a single
message M ′ /∈ N . The attack succeeds if Bob accepts, and it fails otherwise. In
choosing M ′ the attacker can use all the information obtained from the information
gathering stage, which includes the messages sent previously by Alice without the
attacker’s request. The deception stage is illustrated in Fig. 2.7.
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Alice Eve Bob
Input (M , Bob)
Compute split(M) = (m1, m2)
m2−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
m1============================⇒
Let M ′ = reconstruct(m1, m′2).
If M ′ ∈M, output (Alice, M ′),
reject otherwise.
Choose m′2
Let m′1 = m1
m′2−−−−−−→
m′1======⇒
Let M ′ = reconstruct(m′1, m
′
2).
If M ′ ∈M, output (Alice, M ′),
reject otherwise.
The dashed box is taking place during the information gathering stage.




Replay m′1 = ni1 for
m′1======⇒ Accept if reconstruct(m′1, m′2) ∈M
some i ∈ {1, . . . , q} and reconstruct(m′1, m′2) /∈ N ,
reject otherwise.
Figure 2.7: Deception Phase of an Attack
Note that anyone can replay both flows of a previous conversation between Alice
and Bob. In this case, Bob accepts a message that was previously sent by Alice.
However, this replay impersonation does not constitute an attack. In a successful
attack, the adversary is required to replay the authenticated flow and change the
information sent over the insecure channel. The first flow could be a replay of a
previously transmitted first flow. However, the two flows of the attack should not
be identical to a previous conversation of Alice and Bob, otherwise the “attack” is
considered a replay.
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2.1.2 Security Analysis
In this section, we prove that GNIMAP is secure given the properties enumerated
in Section 2.1 and under the attack model described in Section 2.1.1. The proof is
based on a reduction.
Associated to each attack, there are sets N and N , resulting from the informa-
tion gathering stage, and a pair (m′1,m
′
2), from the deception stage, according to
our attack model. Let N = {M1,M2, . . . ,Mq}. Then, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ q
N = {(ni1, ni2) : 1 ≤ i ≤ q} ⊂ M1 ×M2, where reconstruct(ni1, ni2) = Mi.
The pair (m′1,m
′
2) corresponds to the deception stage, where the adversary replays
m′1 over the authenticated channel, and sends m
′
2 over the insecure channel.
Let us assume that an attack has occurred and Bob has accepted. That is, the
adversary has impersonated Alice by sending the pair (m′1,m
′
2) to Bob. Moreover,
Bob has accepted and has output (M ′, Alice), where M ′ = reconstruct(m′1,m
′
2).
In any successful attack, the adversary needs to replay the authenticated flow.
As a result, m′1 ∈ {n11, n21, . . . , nq1}. That is m′1 = ni1, for some 1 ≤ i ≤ q. Let i
be the smallest index for which m′1 = ni1. Moreover, M
′ /∈ {M1,M2, . . . ,Mq}, since
otherwise the attack is only a replay and not a real attack.
We now formally prove that the GNIMAP is secure given that (split, reconstruct)
is (T, ε)-binding. That is, we reduce an adversary who can attack the GNIMAP










Mq−−−−−−−−−→ Compute split(Mq) = (nq1, nq2)
(nq1, nq2)←−−−−−−−−−
Replay m′1 = ni1
(m′1, m
′
2)−−−−−−−−−→ Eve wins if reconstruct(m′1, m′2) = M ′
for some i ∈ {1, . . . , q} and M /∈ {M1, . . . , Mq}.
Figure 2.8: GNIMAP Game
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Consider the game depicted in Fig. 2.8. We call this game the “GNIMAP game”.
This is because, if Eve wins this game with probability ε, then the game translates
into an attack against GNIMAP with success probability ε. Here, Eve is facing a
challenger who is simulating both Alice and Bob. The game consists of q rounds
of Eve sending messages Mi and the challenger responding with (ni1, ni2), where
split(Mi) = (ni1, ni2). These q rounds correspond to the information gathering
phase of the attack. The last round is analogous to the deception phase where Eve
sends her pair (m′1,m
′
2). Eve wins the game if m
′





Assuming that Eve wins this game with non-negligible probability, we can em-
ploy her in the Binding game of Fig. 2.1.












Mj−→ M = Mj
M−→ split(M) =
(m1, m2)


















Figure 2.9: Reducing the GNIMAP Game to the Binding Game
Depicted in Fig. 2.9, Eve is playing against her GNIMAP game challenger (which
is simulated by Oscar), while Oscar is playing against his Binding game challenger.
Oscar will use the results of the GNIMAP game to win his Binding game. He first
chooses a random value j ∈R {1, . . . , q}. Then, Eve will carry out her own attack
against the GNIMAP challenger. That is, Eve sends messages Mt and receives nt1
and nt2.
The responses, nt1 and nt2, come from computing split(Mt), except when t =
j. In the jth round, Oscar forwards M = Mj to his challenger. The challenger
responds with a pair (m1,m2). Then, Oscar forwards nj1 = m1 and nj2 = m2 to
Eve.
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After q rounds, Eve chooses a message M ′ and sends m′1 and m
′
2. Note that
for Eve to win, m′1 = ni1 for some i ∈ {1, . . . , q}. Oscar simply forwards m′2 to his
challenger if j = i, and quits otherwise.
Note that from Eve’s point of view, this game is no different than the game of
Fig. 2.8.
Assuming that Eve wins her game with probability p, Oscar clearly wins his
game with probability p/q. Hence, we have proved the following Theorem.
Theorem 1. Assume that there is a GNIMAP where the pair (split, reconstruct)
is (T, ε)-binding. In the ACPA model, any adversary against this GNIMAP with
querying complexity q and offline complexity T has a probability of success p at most
qε.
We note that our reduction is not tight. However, it is normal to assume that
q ≤ 210 in manual authentication scenarios.2
2.2 Previous NIMAPs
In this section, we first define the kind of hash functions that are going to come
up in our discussion. Secondly, we briefly introduce the previous NIMAPs found
in the literature. Then, the security of these protocols is analyzed with respect to
our general model.
We use the following definitions of different types of hash functions in the rest
of the chapter.
A Collision Resistant (CR) Hash Function H, is a hash function where it
is hard to find distinct elements x and y such that H(x) = H(y). The pair (x, y) is
called a collision pair. For security purposes, the length of the hash value is required
to be more than 2k bits, where output size of H is k. Otherwise, an adversary has
a good chance of finding a collision pair using an offline birthday attack.
A Second-Preimage Resistant (SPR) Hash FunctionH, is a hash function
where given a value x, it is hard to find a value y, x 6= y, such that H(x) = H(y).
In this case, the best generic attack is exhaustive search. Hence, the length of the
hash value is required to be at least k bits.
2The reduction proposed by Pasini and Vaudenay [PV06] is also not tight and they get the
same probability of success, p/q. They also assume that q ≤ 210.
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An ε-Universal Hash Function Family, (ε-UHFF) H is a collection of
functions HK depending on a random key K, where Pr[HK(x) = HK(y)] ≤ ε for
any two distinct values x and y, where the probability is taken over the choices of
K.
We now briefly summarize three NIMAPs found in the literature.
Balfanz-Smetters-Stewart-Wong NIMAP Balfanz et al. [BSSW02] intro-
duced the idea of hashing the data to be authenticated and delivering the hash
value in an authenticated way to the verifier. Their protocol is based on a collision
resistant hash function. It is depicted in Fig. 2.10.
Alice Bob
Input M
M−−−−−−→ Receive M ′
Compute h = H(M)
h
======⇒ Receive h and accept if
h = H(M ′). Reject otherwise.
Figure 2.10: Balfanz et al. NIMAP
The adversary can work offline and find a collision M1 and M2 yielding the
same hash value. Then, M1 is given to Alice in the information gathering stage and
she sends Bob the value of H(M1) over the authenticated channel. The adversary
replays this authenticated flow along with M2 and makes Bob accept. This attack
is depicted in Fig. 2.11. If the adversary can mount the above attack efficiently,
then this protocol fails to satisfy property (ii) of Section 2.1.
Alice Eve Bob










Figure 2.11: Attack against the Balfanz et al. NIMAP
The collision pair, M1 and M2, could be found using a “birthday attack”. Birth-
day attacks have square root complexity. If we consider algorithms of complexity
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280 inefficient, then in order to make this attack not efficient we need to increase
the size of the authenticated bits, that is, h, to 160 bits.
Gehrmann-Mitchell-Nyberg MAP: MANA I Gehrmann et al. [GMN04] in-
troduced MANA I, for manual authentication, based on an ε-universal hash func-
tion family H. The original form of this protocol is not a NIMAP. Later, Vaudenay
[Vau05] proposed a non-interactive version of MANA I. This protocol is depicted
in Fig. 2.12. In the original proposal, confidentiality of the authenticated channel
is required. This requirement is very restrictive in general. Vaudenay [Vau05] has
proved that a “stall-free” authenticated channel is enough to ensure the security
of MANA I. In a stall-free channel, once a message is sent, it is either received by
the recipient right away or it is never received. In other words, it is not possible
to delay a flow under this assumption. However, the stall-free requirement is still




Choose K ∈R {0, 1}k
Compute h = HK(M)
h, K
======⇒
Accept if h = HK(M
′) and
reject otherwise.
Figure 2.12: MANA I
According to our model, the adversary can record a pair (HK(M), K) from
the information gathering stage and find M ′ such that HK(M) = HK(M
′). The
adversary then sends M ′ over the insecure channel and replays (HK(M), K) over
the authenticated channel. (Note that this attack will not work in a stall-free
channel.) Having recorded K, finding M ′ such that HK(M) = HK(M
′) is usually
an easy computation. This is because the function HK is a member of a universal
hash family and typically it has a simple structure3.
Pasini-Vaudenay NIMAP Pasini and Vaudenay [PV06] proposed a NIMAP,
illustrated in Fig. 2.13, based on Second-Preimage Resistant hash functions. The
protocol is in the Common Reference String (CRS) model, which assumes a random
string Kp has been previously distributed to everyone. The commit function has
3For example, here is one commonly used universal hash family. Let p be a large prime and let
n < p. For all pairs K = (a, b) ∈ Zp∗×Zp, define a hash function hK(x) = (ax+ b mod p) mod n.
The family {hK} is a universal hash family.
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two inputs: the message M and the CRS Kp. It outputs a commit value c and
a decommit value d. This function is non-deterministic and is playing the role of
the split algorithm. The open algorithm, on the other hand, is a deterministic
algorithm. It uniquely outputs M on input (Kp, c, d).
Alice Bob
input M
(c, d)← commit(Kp, M)
(c‖d)
−−−−−−→ M ′ ← open(Kp, c′, d′)
Compute h = H(c)
h
======⇒ Accept if h = H(c′) and
reject otherwise.
Figure 2.13: Pasini-Vaudenay NIMAP
An adversary attacking the NIMAP is reduced to an adversary who finds second-
preimages or breaks the trapdoor of the commitments, details can be found in
[PV06]. To achieve security against an adversary with complexity 280 and q = 210,
they need to authenticate 100 bits. More details can be found in [PV06].
There is always the issue of authenticity attached to public parameters such as
Kp. Hence, it possibly restricts the application of this NIMAP. Moreover, we are
trying to replace the use of any PKI by using NIMAPs. As a result, this protocol
does not seem to be the optimal solution.
On the other hand, this NIMAP is based on the assumption that trapdoor
commitment schemes exist, as well as SPR hash functions. This protocol satisfies
the properties of Section 2.1.
2.3 A New Computationally Secure NIMAP
In this section, we first define Hybrid-Collision Resistance for hash functions. Sec-
ondly, we discuss the difficulty of finding hybrid-collisions. Moreover, a new NIMAP
based on Hybrid-Collision Resistant hash functions is introduced. The security of
this NIMAP is ensured by showing that it satisfies the properties we listed in Section
2.1 when using Hybrid-Collision Resistant hash functions.
2.3.1 Hybrid-Collision Resistant Hash Function
We define a Hybrid-Collision Resistant (HCR) Hash Function H, to be a
hash function in which the game of Fig. 2.14 is hard, for fixed values l1 and l2.
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Moreover, we say H is a (T, ε)-HCRHF if an adversary with complexity T wins the
game of Fig. 2.14 with probability at most ε.
Oscar challenger
Choose M , |M | = l1.
M−−−−−−→ Choose K ∈R {0, 1}l2 .
K←−−−−−−
Choose L, |L| = l1 + l2.
L−−−−−−→ Oscar wins if L 6= M‖K
and H(M‖K) = H(L).
Figure 2.14: HCR Game
Furthermore, we call the pair (L,M‖K) a hybrid-collision. Note that if l2 = 0,
then HCR is equivalent to CR. On the other hand, HCR is very close to SPR when
l1 = 0. (The lengths are fixed in the HCR game.) In fact, HCR is interpolating
between CR and SPR. This suggests that finding hybrid-collisions is at least as
hard as collisions, but at most as hard as second-preimages. We will investigate
this matter in more detail in the next section.
2.3.2 On the Difficulty of the HCR Game
As far as we know, the problem of finding hybrid-collisions has not been previously
addressed in the literature. Here, we investigate this problem in the random oracle
model. This gives us an intuition about the difficulty of the problem compared to
finding collisions or second-preimages.
Let H be a hash function randomly chosen from FX ,Y (the set of all functions
from X to Y), where X = {0, 1}l1+l2 is the set of all possible binary strings of
length l1 + l2 and |Y| = 2k. Assume that we are only permitted oracle access to H,
i.e., the only way to compute H(x) is to query the value x to the oracle. Further,
assume that the adversary, Oscar, is able to access the random oracle T times,
where T = 2t.
In order to analyze the difficulty of the HCR game, we find an upper bound on
the probability ε of Oscar winning the HCR game.
Let distinct random values X1, X2, . . . , XT be Oscar’s inputs to the random
oracle. Moreover, let the hybrid-collision be (L,M‖K). We write Xi = Mi‖Ki,
where |Ki| = l2 and |Mi| = l1, for all i = 1, . . . , T .
Let D denote the event that M‖K is equal to one of X1, ..., XT , and let E
denote the event that M‖K collides with some Xi (i.e. H(M‖K) = H(Xi) where
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M‖K 6= Xi). We are interested in computing an upper bound on Pr[E]. We will
do this by conditioning on the event D:
Pr[E] = Pr[¬D]× Pr[E|¬D] + Pr[D]× Pr[E|D]
≤ Pr[E|¬D] + Pr[D]× Pr[E|D]
= Pr[E|¬D] + Pr[D andE].
Denote ε1 = Pr[E|¬D] and ε2 = Pr[D andE]. We will compute upper bounds
on ε1 and ε2.
Given ¬D, the probability that H(M‖K) = H(Xj) for any given j is 2−k.
Hence, the probability of occurrence of at least one collision is ε1 = 1− (1− 2−k)T .
If T = 2t is small compared to 2k, then ε1 is approximately 2
t−k.
We bound ε2 as follows. Construct a graph G with V (G) and E(G), denoting the
set of vertices and edges respectively, where V (G) = {X1, X2, . . . , XT}. Moreover,
for any m and n, m 6= n, XmXn ∈ E(G) if and only if H(Xm) = H(Xn). Now
define V ′ = {Xi ∈ V (G) : deg(Xi) ≥ 1}. It is clear that ε2 = Pr[M‖K ∈ V ′].
Let Exp[|V ′|] denote the expectation of |V ′|. Now, since K is a random bitstring
of length l2, Pr[M‖K ∈ V ′] ≤ Exp[|V ′|]× 2−l2 , where the expectation is taken over
the choices of K and H.
Note that the maximum number of edges of G is T 2/2. Furthermore, for any
randomly chosen Xm and Xn, the probability that XmXn is an edge is 2
−k. Hence,
the expected number of edges of G is 2−kT 2/2 = 22t−k−1. In addition, the expected
number of vertices of positive degree is at most 22t−k. As a result, Exp[|V ′|] ≤ 22t−k.
Therefore, ε2 ≤ 22t−k−l2 .
Let C denote the event that Oscar wins the HCR game. Now, we compute
Pr[C] = Pr[¬E]× Pr[C|¬E] + Pr[E]× Pr[C|E]
≤ Pr[C|¬E] + Pr[E]
= 2−k + ε1 + ε2
≤ (2t + 1)2−k + 22t−k−l2
≈ 2t−k + 22t−k−l2 .
Note that the length of the original message, l1, has no influence in the analysis
in the random oracle model. However, once a concrete hash function is chosen, the
amount of time it takes to compute a hash function is in proportion to the size of
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the input, and as a result, the size of the message will be a factor to consider. The
shorter the messages are, the more hash function computations can be handled in
a fixed amount of time.
In Section 2.3.4 we examine p, the overall success probability of the adversary,
given particular values for parameters k, t and l2.
2.3.3 A new NIMAP based on HCR hash functions.
Let H be an HCR hash function and fix k, l1, and l2. Now, consider the following
proposed NIMAP.
1. On input (M , Bob), |M | = l1, Alice chooses K ∈R {0, 1}l2 uniformly at
random.
2. Alice sends (M,K) to Bob over the broadband channel.
3. Bob receives (M ′, K ′), where |M ′| = l1 and |K ′| = l2.
4. Alice computes h = H(M‖K) and sends h to Bob over the authenticated
channel.
5. Bob receives h from Alice.
6. Bob outputs (Alice, M ′) if h = H(M ′‖K ′), and rejects otherwise.
The above NIMAP is also depicted in Fig. 2.15.
Alice Bob
Input (M , Bob), |M | = l1,
Choose K ∈R {0, 1}l2 .
M, K
−−−−−−−−−→ Receive M ′, K′.
Compute h = H(M‖K). h=========⇒ Receive h′, accept if h = H(M ′‖K′),
reject otherwise.
Figure 2.15: The New NIMAP
In this NIMAP, m1 = H(M‖K) = h and m2 = (M,K) for a random key K.
Moreover, for any M ′, K ′ and h, reconstruct(h, (M ′, K ′)) = M ′ if h = H(M ′‖K ′),
and reconstruct(h, (M ′, K ′)) =⊥ otherwise.
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Clearly, this (split, reconstruct) satisfies the Property (i) of Section 2.1. That
is, any message M can be uniquely recovered:
reconstruct(split(M)) = reconstruct(H(M‖K), (M,K)) = M.
Next we need to show that our (split, reconstruct) satisfies the Property (ii)
of Section 2.1 which says: It is computationally infeasible to find a message M
such that given (m1,m2), where split(M) = (m1,m2), one can efficiently find an
m′2 ∈M2 \{m2} so that reconstruct(m1,m′2) ∈M with non-negligible probability.
We substitute for the split and reconstruct algorithms and restate the Binding
Property for our NIMAP as follows:
It is computationally infeasible to find a message M , |M | = l1, such that given
H(M‖K) and K, K ∈R {0, 1}l2 , one can efficiently find an L of size l1 + l2, L 6=
M‖K, so that H(L) = H(M‖K) with non-negligible probability.
This is implied from the assumption that the HCR game is hard. Note that
the binding property for our NIMAP translates to HCR game being hard, but the
opposite is not true and does not need to hold for our application. In other words,
Oscar may win the HCR game by finding a collision of the form (M‖K ′,M‖K),
with K 6= K ′. However, this collision does not constitute an attack against our
NIMAP since the messages are the same. On the other hand, all instances of a
successful attack against our NIMAP translate into a winning strategy against the
HCR game.
Assuming that H is a (T, ε)-HCRHF, we conclude that (split, reconstruct) of
this NIMAP is (T, ε)-binding. Hence, we get the following Corollary of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. Let H be a (T, ε)-HCRHF. Any adversary against the NIMAP of
Fig. 2.15, with querying complexity q and offline complexity T , has a probability of
success p at most qε.
Note that we do not require any public parameters to be distributed ahead of
time. One could argue that the description of the HCR hash function needs to
be distributed in an authentic manner ahead of time. In practice, however, these
protocols are going to use standard built-in hash functions which do not require
any authentication of public parameters, which would be required for commitment
schemes.
Our new protocol looks similar to the protocol of Fig. 2.12 with the differ-
ence that K is moved from the authenticated channel to the broadband channel.
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However, there are several differences. The underlying hash function security re-
quirement is different, properties of the channels are different, and the resulting
overall security of our protocol is different from those of MANA I and its NIMAP
version depicted in Fig. 2.12. We do not assume that our channels provide con-
fidentiality or are stall-free. The notion of hybrid-collision resistance is different
from the security notion of ε-universal hash function families.
In our protocol, `1, which is the length of the messages being authenticated, is a
fixed parameter. That is, our protocol only authenticates messages of fixed length.
However, note that M is being sent over the broadband channel and sending long
messages over this channel is very cheap. As a result, we can set `1 large enough
for the desired application, and pad short messages with a one followed by enough
zeros, if necessary.
2.3.4 Parameter sizes
Let T = 2t and q be the offline and querying complexities respectively. That is, the
adversary is allowed to use T hash computations and make Alice send q messages
to Bob. Moreover, let H be a (T, ε)-HCRHF and let k be the size of H.
According to Corollary 1, an adversary attacking our proposed NIMAP, using
T hash computations and q messages, has probability of success p ≤ qε.
Pasini and Vaudenay [PV06] assume that q ≤ 210 and t ≤ 70. They also require
the probability of success of the adversary against the protocol of Fig. 2.13 be less
that 2−20. For this to happen, one needs to authenticate 100 bits. That is k = 100.
Using the same parameters, q ≤ 210, t ≤ 70, and k = 100 we obtain that
ε ≈ 2−30 + 240−l2 . In order to achieve the same level of security obtained by Pasini
and Vaudenay [PV06], i.e., p ≤ 2−20, we should have ε ≈ 2−30. Thus, if we let l2
large enough, e.g., l2 ≥ 80, in our protocol of Fig. 2.15, then we obtain the same
level of security of the protocol of Fig. 2.13. That is, the amount of information
sent over the authenticated channel is the same as in the Pasini-Vaudenay protocol.
2.3.5 Advantages of the proposed NIMAP
Our proposed NIMAP of Fig. 2.15 benefits from a simple and easy to implement
structure. It is based on a single assumption that HCR hash functions exist. Note
that any CR hash function satisfies the HCR notion.
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We do not use any commitment scheme or require any public parameters avail-
able to users such as the CRS. The amount of information sent over the authenti-
cated channel is as low as the most secure NIMAP proposed so far, while achieving
the same level of security.
2.4 On Unconditionally Secure NIMAPs
We have so far focused on design and analysis of NIMAPs that are secure against
a computationally bound adversary. The alternative is to consider adversaries who
have access to unbounded amounts of time and resources. In this section, we
show that the only NIMAPs which are secure in the presence of such unbounded
adversaries are trivial protocols. In other words, the entire message has to be sent
over the authenticated channel in order for a NIMAP to be unconditionally secure.
In other words, non-trivial NIMAPs that are unconditionally secure do not exist.
This result was first proved by Wang and Safavi-Naini [WSN08] using probability
distribution arguments. We provide a new proof in the form of a simple counting
argument.
2.4.1 Wang and Safavi-Naini’s Proof
Wang and Safavi-Naini [WSN08] first showed the impossibility of designing non-
trivial unconditionally secure NIMAPs. They used the following model to describe
the unconditionally secure NIMAP:
The information theoretic NIMAP model: The sender S sends the message m
and some x over the insecure public channel, and a tag t over the manual channel.
The receiver R decides whether or not to accept m as authentic from S.
Wang and Safavi-Naini showed that unconditionally secure NIMAPs do not
exist without secrets between sender and receiver, and without requirements such as
stall-free on the narrow-band channel, unless the whole message is transmitted over
the narrow-band channel. This results in a trivial protocol where the authenticated
channel has enough bandwidth to transmit the whole message.
They suppose |m| > |t| and propose an attack. First, they show that there
definitely exists some other message m′ such that m′ can be authenticated under
some x′, possibly different from x, and the same tag t. Now, the adversary, on
observing the authentication transcripts (m,x, t), replaces m and x with m′ and x′.
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They further note that the adversary can mount this attack online by removing
m and x from the broadband channel and delaying t on the narrow-band channel
until she finds an appropriate m′ and x′. Then, she sends m′ and x′ over the
broadband channel and let t be transmitted over the narrow-band channel right
after.
In order to formally prove the effectiveness of their attack, for example when
proving the existence of appropriate m′ and x′, they use probability distribution
arguments involving Shannon entropies.
2.4.2 A Counting Argument
We now present a much shorter and simpler proof of non-existence of nontrivial
NIMAPs. Our proof is based on a counting argument.
We use the same model used by Wang and Safavi-Naini [WSN08] and define
M to be the set of all possible messages to be authenticated and R to be the set
of all possible strings that could be sent on the first flow along with a possible
message. Moreover, we let S be the set of all authenticating tags that are sent over
the authenticated channel. An instance of an NIMAP in this model is as follows. A
message M ∈ M is to be authenticated and it is sent over the broadband channel
along with some information r ∈ R. Later, an authenticating tag s ∈ S is sent over
the narrow-band channel. Figure 2.16 depicts this NIMAP.
Alice Bob
Input (M , Bob)
M, r−−−→
s==⇒
Output (Alice, M ′) or reject.
Figure 2.16: A General NIMAP
Let V be set of all transcripts which result in Bob accepting a message, that is
V = {(M, r, s) : Bob accepts the triple (M, r, s)}.
Note that, V is public knowledge and a computationally unbounded adversary can
find or store V ahead of time.
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If |M| ≤ |S|, then there exists a trivial NIMAP where the whole message is
transmitted over the authenticated channel. We assume that |M| > |S| to consider
non-trivial NIMAPs. For every tag s ∈ S, we let Ms be the set of all messages
such that there exists some r in which (M, r, s) results in an acceptance by Bob.
In other words,
Ms := {M : (M, r, s) ∈ V for some r}.
Moreover, we let U be the set of all tags that can authenticate only one message,
that is
U := {s : |Ms| = 1}.
Note, |U| ≤ |S|. Next, suppose |U| = |S|. Then
∑
|Ms| = |S|, which implies∑
|Ms| < |M| which is a contradiction. Hence, |U| < |S|.






Since |U| < |S|, we obtain that |MU | < |S|, which implies |MU | < |M|.
Hence, there exists an M in M\MU such that, for any (M, r, s) ∈ V , there exists
(M ′, r′, s) ∈ V with M 6= M ′.
The attack is comprised of Eve choosing any M ∈ M \ MU and giving it
to Alice. Later, when she receives (M, r, s) from Alice, she replaces it with the
appropriate (M ′, r′, s), that we know exists. Note that Eve is computationally
unbounded and can find such an M . Moreover, after receiving (M, r, s) from Alice,






s==⇒ Verify (M ′, r′, s) ∈ V.
Figure 2.17: An Attack Against the General NIMAP
To conclude, we have shown that non-trivial NIMAPs that are unconditionally
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In this chapter, we propose an Interactive Message Authentication Protocol
(IMAP) using two channels: an insecure broadband channel and an authenticated
narrow-band channel [MS08a]. We consider the problem in the context of ad hoc
networks, where it is assumed that there is neither a secret key shared between the
two parties, nor a public-key infrastructure in place. The security of our IMAP is
based on the existence of Interactive-Collision Resistant (ICR) hash functions, a
new notion of hash function security introduced in Section 3.3.1.
In Section 3.1, we summarize the results on existing IMAPs in the literature.
In Section 3.2, the attack model is described. Section 3.3 is devoted to introducing
our IMAP which is based on the computational assumption that ICR hash func-
tions exist. It performs better than any other message authentication protocols
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that are based on computational assumptions. That is, while achieving the same
level of security, the amount of information sent over the authenticated channel
in our IMAP is smaller than the most secure IMAP and Non-interactive Message
Authentication Protocol (NIMAP) in the literature. Alternatively, if we send the
same amount of information over the authenticated channel, we can allow much
stronger adversaries compared to the existing protocols in the literature.
Our protocol has a very simple structure and does not require any long strings
to be distributed ahead of time. The security of our protocol is investigated in
Section 3.3.3. We allow offline attacks by an adversary. As before, the attack
model is the adaptive chosen plain-text attack (ACPA) model. Both substitution
and impersonation attacks are analyzed in this model. The ACPA model is a
strong model, and as a result, a scheme that is proven secure in this model does
not require authenticated channels that have any unusual properties. In the ACPA
model, the adversary has offline computational power and can induce the users to
send messages of the adversary’s choice. In this chapter, we give further power
to the adversaries by allowing them to have online computational power. That is,
they are allowed to do hash function computations, or make oracle queries, while
they are in the middle of an attack.
Furthermore, our IMAP benefits from a simple structure and works under fewer
security assumptions compared to other IMAPs in the literature. The simplicity
and the easy-to-use structure of the protocol makes it applicable in a wide variety
of real-world settings where ad hoc networks have no trusted infrastructure. For
instance, it can be used in pairings of wireless devices such as Wireless USB and
Bluetooth, in Personal Area Networks (PANs), or in a disaster case where a trusted
infrastructure has been compromised.
We analyze the security and efficiency of our IMAP and show that the perfor-
mance of our IMAP is better than that of other IMAPs and NIMAPs proposed so
far. In other words, our IMAP achieves a better level of security, while benefiting
from an efficient structure and having to send fewer bits over the authenticated
channel. To reiterate, if we want to send the same amount of information, then we
can assume much stronger adversaries in terms of online computational complexity.
This chapter is concluded in Section 3.4 by proposing a generalization of an
unconditionally secure IMAP [NSS06]. Sufficient conditions for our IMAP to be
secure are found.
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3.1 Previous IMAPs
A non-interactive protocol is, in general, preferred to an interactive protocol if they
are achieving the exact same goals. In other words, interactive protocols are sup-
posed to either achieve better security or be more efficient than their non-interactive
competitors, otherwise, one would choose to implement non-interactive protocols
and obtain the same results. For instance, having a bidirectional channel may cost
more than a unidirectional channel, or devices may have different computational
capabilities, allowing one device to be the master and the other be the slave in the
communication. However, we note that NIMAPs achieve a strictly weaker notion of
security when compared to IMAPs. This is because NIMAPs, on their own, prov-
ably cannot protect against replay attacks of the authenticated flow, while IMAPs
can. (One could use a time-stamping technique to solve this problem for NIMAPs,
however.)
The IMAP presented in this chapter is based on a computational assumption.
As a result, we can only compare its security and efficiency to similar IMAPs that
are based on computational assumptions.
Hoepman [Hoe04] proposed an authenticated key agreement protocol that uses
both a bidirectional narrow-band channel and a bidirectional broadband channel.
This interactive protocol consists of a commitment exchange, an authentication
exchange, and finally a decisional Diffie-Hellman problem in a group G. The secu-
rity is based on the hardness of the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem in G and on
two hash functions H1 and H2 having a very specific structure. Vaudenay [Vau05]
observed that instances of such hash functions may not exist at all.
Vaudenay [Vau05] proposed an IMAP based on equivocable or extractable com-
mitment schemes. The protocol is designed in the Common Reference String model
where a random string is authentically predistributed among all users. The random
string is then used to compute commitment values. This protocol is depicted in
Fig. 3.1.
By targeting typical parameters, such as offline complexity of 270 and q = 210,
Vaudenay’s protocol requires authenticating 50 bits to get the probability of suc-
cess of the adversary to be at most 2−20. This protocol achieves a good level of
security when compared to other proposals in the literature. However, the only
efficient commitment schemes, with the specific properties required here, are in the
Random Oracle Model. There are other instances of such commitment schemes in
the standard model, but the number of rounds is logarithmic in terms of the secu-
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Alice Bob
Input (Bob, M), Choose RA ∈ {0, 1}k Choose RB ∈ {0, 1}k
uniformly at random uniformly at random
(c, d)← commit(M, RA)
(M‖c)
−−−−−−→ Receive (M ′, c′)
Receive R′B
RB←−−−−−−
d−−−−−−→ Receive d′ and compute
R′A ← open(M
′, c′, d′)




======⇒ If R = R′A
⊕
RB , then output
(Alice, M ′) and reject otherwise.
Figure 3.1: Vaudenay’s IMAP
rity parameters and their analyses involve zero-knowledge proofs. Also, there are
some efficient commitment schemes with the appropriate properties in the Common
Random String (CRS) model. However, the CRS model might not be suitable in
an ad hoc setting where it is not practical to authentically distribute a random
string to every user. We note that the possibility that the adversary does online
computations has not been considered in Vaudenay’s protocol.
Another recent paper, by Naor, Segev and Smith [NSS06], investigates two-
channel authentication in the interactive setting. They achieve unconditional se-
curity using evaluation of polynomials over finite fields. For every integer k, their
IMAP allows the sender to authenticate an n-bit message in k rounds, such that the
length of the authenticated string is about 2 log(1/ε)+2 log(k−1) n+O(1). By setting
k = log(n) +O(1), the manually authenticated string is of length 2 log(1/ε). They
conclude that the advantage of assuming computational security is to reduce the
amount of information that needs to be authenticated from 2 log(1/ε) to log(1/ε),
and not to reduce the number of flows of the protocol.
3.2 The Attack Model
The adversary is trying to make Bob accept a message M ′ along with the identity
of Alice, when in fact the message M ′ was never sent by Alice to Bob. That is, the
adversarial goal is to make Bob output (Alice, M ′) when he was supposed to reject
(Alice, M ′) or accept (Alice, M) for some sM 6= M ′. There are two main types of
attacks to consider: impersonation attacks and substitution attacks.
In an impersonation attack, the adversary initiates a session and tries to con-
vince Bob that a message M ′ is sent from Alice, while in fact M ′ was never sent
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from Alice. In our model, the attacker cannot initiate a new authenticated flow.
She can only replay a previous authenticated flow. Hence, the authenticated flow
in an impersonation attack constitutes of a replay of a previous authenticated flow
sent by Alice to Bob.
On the other hand, a substitution attack occurs when Alice initiates a session
with Bob, and tries to send him a message M . Then, the attacker substitutes M ′ for
M , so, Bob receives M ′ and not M . The authenticated flow cannot be substituted
according to the model, and hence any potential changes occur in the broadband
channel. There are two types of substitution attacks; see Section 3.3.3.
Moreover, we assume that the adversary can make Alice send a message that
the adversary has chosen. This ability of the adversary may not be considered in all
models. We do consider it in our model since it makes the adversary more powerful
and results in a stronger level of security. The adaptive chosen plaintext attack
(ACPA) model is very strong and desirable compared to other models. It consists
of two stages: an information gathering stage and a deception stage. In addition,
we assume that the attacker has precomputing capabilities and is able to mount
“dictionary-type” attacks.
The term offline complexity is used to refer to the computational complexity
Toff = 2
toff of an adversary up to and including the information gathering stage.
The term online complexity refers to the computational complexity Ton = 2
ton of
an adversary during the deception stage of a substitution attack. Furthermore, the
number of messages sent by Alice to Bob during the information gathering stage is
denoted by q. The parameter toff is chosen in agreement with the usual capabilities
of a computationally bounded adversary assuming today’s computational power of
computers. For instance, toff ≤ 80 or toff ≤ 70 are commonly used bounds in the
literature as of December of 2008. The choice for the parameter ton depends on the
structure and application scenario of the particular protocol under discussion.
In the information gathering stage, the adversary is allowed to adaptively choose
q messages and make Alice send them to Bob. The communication is then recorded
for further use. The adversary hopes that this stage of an attack gradually reveals
information about the unknown aspects of the protocol.
The deception stage happens after the information gathering phase. The at-
tacker tries to make Bob accept a message M ′ along with the identity of Alice,
when he was supposed to reject. We note that the message M ′ should be different
from all the messages previously sent by Alice, otherwise we consider the “attack”
only a “replay”.
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Let M be the set of all messages, and let x ∈ X , y ∈ Y , and s ∈ S, for some
sets X ,Y , and S. Figure 3.2 depicts a 3-round generic IMAP (3GIMAP).
Alice Bob
Input (M , Bob)
M, x





===⇒ Output (Alice, M ′) or reject.
Figure 3.2: 3GIMAP
Gehrman [Geh98] looked at different possible attacks against a generic k-round






distinct attacks. He used the
following notation to label these attacks. A flow initiated by the adversary is
labelled as A if it sent to Alice, and, similarly, a flow sent by the adversary is






possible attacks against a three round protocol, namely AABB, ABBA, BABA,
ABAB, BBAA, and BAAB attacks.
The last flow of 3GIMAP is an authenticated flow sent by Alice to Bob. Accord-
ing to the communication model of two-channel cryptography, the adversary can
only replay this last flow. As a result, the only possible attacks against 3GIMAP
are the ones that end with a flow sent to Bob, namely AABB, ABAB, and BAAB.














===⇒ Output (Alice, M ′) or reject.
Figure 3.3: Attack of Type AABB
The attack of type AABB is an impersonation attack whereas the attacks of
type BAAB and type ABAB are substitution attacks. Details are explained in
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===⇒ s===⇒ Output (Alice, M ′) or reject.












===⇒ s===⇒ Output (Alice, M ′) or reject.
Figure 3.5: Attack of Type BAAB
3.3 A New Computationally Secure IMAP
We begin by defining new notion of hash function security which we call Interactive-
Collision Resistance (ICR). We continue by introducing a new IMAP based on ICR
hash functions. The security of this IMAP is based on the hardness of the ICR
problems.
3.3.1 Interactive-Collision Resistance
In this section, we begin by defining Interactive-Collision Resistance I, II and III
(ICRI, ICRII, and ICRIII respectively) for hash functions. Then, we state and
prove three lemmas about the security of ICRI, ICRII, and ICRIII hash functions.
ICRI, ICRII, and ICRIII properties are going to guard our protocol against attack
of type ABAB, BAAB, and AABB, respectively.
40
Chapter 3. Interactive Message Authentication Protocols
§3.3. A New Computationally Secure IMAP
To our knowledge, this is the first time that the problem of finding interactive-
collisions of type I, II, and III are being investigated. We analyze the ICRI, ICRII,
and ICRIII Games in the Random Oracle Model. This analysis yields some insight
into the hardness of these games compared to Collision Resistance (CR) or Second-
Preimage Resistance (SPR). Note that we do not have any concrete constructions
for designing such hash functions in the standard model. We pose this as an open
problem.
Definition 1. A hash function H is Interactive-Collision Resistant I (ICRI) if
the game of Fig. 3.6 is hard to win, for fixed values of `1, `2, and `3. In addition, the
pair (M‖K‖R′,M ′‖K ′‖R) is called an interactive-collision of type I. Furthermore,
we call H a (Toff , ε1)-ICRI hash function if an adversary, who can make up to Toff
hash function computations, wins the ICRI game with probability at most ε1.
Oscar challenger
Choose M , |M | = `1
M−−−−−−→
K←−−−−−− Choose K ∈ {0, 1}`2 uniformly at random
Choose R′, |R′| = `3
R′−−−−−−→
Choose M ′, |M ′| = `1
M ′−−−−−−→
Choose K′, |K′| = `2
K′−−−−−−→
R←−−−−−− Choose R ∈ {0, 1}`3 uniformly at random
Oscar wins if H(M‖K‖R′) = H(M ′‖K′‖R)
and M‖K‖R′ 6= M ′‖K′‖R.
Figure 3.6: ICRI Game
Note that if `2 = `3 = 0, then ICRI is equivalent to Collision Resistance (CR).
Further, if `1 = `3 = 0, then ICRI is equivalent to Second-Preimage Resistance
(SPR). In fact, ICRI is interpolating between CR and SPR. This suggests that
solving ICRI game is at least as hard as finding collisions, but no harder than
finding second-preimages.
We can analyze the security of ICRI hash functions, or in other words the
hardness of the ICRI game, in the Random Oracle Model. This will give us an
intuition on how difficult this game is, as compared to former notions of hash
function security. Let FX ,Y denote the set of all functions from a domain X to a
range Y .
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Lemma 1. Let X = {0, 1}`1+`2+`3 be the set of all possible binary strings of length
`1 + `2 + `3. Consider a hash function H chosen randomly from FX ,Y , where |Y| =
2k. Then, H is a (2toff , ε1)-ICRI hash function in the Random Oracle model, where
ε1 = 2
−k(1 + 22toff−`2−`3 + 2toff−`3). In other words, any player with computational
complexity Toff = 2
toff against the challenger of the ICRI game has a probability of
success at most ε1 = 2
−k(1 + 22toff−`2−`3 + 2toff−`3).
Proof. We consider X = {0, 1}`1+`2+`3 , the set of all possible binary strings of size
`1 + `2 + `3, and let a hash function H be chosen randomly from FX ,Y , where
|Y| = 2k.
Assume that we are only permitted oracle access to H, that is we are working in
the Random Oracle Model. We let the adversary have access to the Random Oracle
for Toff = 2
toff times. Given these conditions, we are looking for the probability ε1
of Oscar winning the ICRI game.
Let A = {X1, X2, . . . , XToff} be the queries of Oscar to the Random Oracle,
where |Xi| = `1 + `2 + `3 for 1 ≤ i ≤ Toff . Without loss of generality, we assume
that Xis are distinct, for 1 ≤ i ≤ Toff = 2toff .
Consider the pair (Y, Y ′) = (M‖K‖R′,M ′‖K ′‖R) and write Xis in the form of
Xi = Mi‖Ki‖Ri, where |Mi| = `1, |Ki| = `2 and |Ri| = `3.
We want to find an upper bound on the probability of Oscar winning the ICRI
game by finding Y and Y ′ such that H(Y ) = H(Y ′). We will do this by considering
the following cases:
Case 1. Y ′ /∈ A, that is, Y ′ is not a precomputed value;
Case 2. Y ′ ∈ A and Y /∈ A, that is, Y ′ is precomputed, but Y is not;
Case 3. Y ′ ∈ A and Y ∈ A, that is, Y and Y ′ are both precomputed.
Note that these three cases are mutually exclusive and they cover all possibilities.
We will discuss each case separately.
Case 1. Notice that Y is determined after the third flow. Moreover, Y ′ is not a
precomputed value and yet it collides with Y . Furthermore, Y was determined
before Y ′ was chosen. In this case, the probability that H(Y ) = H(Y ′) is 2−k
due to the properties of Random Oracles.
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Case 2. In this case, Y ′ is precomputed and Y is not. After the third flow, when Y is
determined, the probability that H(Y ) = H(Xj), for some j, is 2
toff−k. Now,
Oscar wants Y ′ = Xj. Therefore, he sends M
′ = Mj and K
′ = Kj. Then,
the challenger responds with a random R′. As a result,
Pr[Y ′ = Xj] = Pr[R
′ = Rj] = 2
−`3 .
Hence, the probability that H(Y ) = H(Y ′) and Y ′ = Xj, when Y is not a
precomputed value, is 2toff−k−`3 .
Case 3. When both Y and Y ′ are precomputed values, it means that Oscar had found
a collision among the precomputed values. Let the colliding values be Xi =
Mi‖Ki‖Ri and Xj = Mj‖Kj‖Rj, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 2toff with i 6= j. We know that






This is approximately equal to 22toff−k−1 when Toff = 2
toff .
After finding a collision in A, Oscar wants Y = Xi and Y ′ = Xj. Therefore,
he lets M = Mi, R
′ = Ri,M
′ = Mj, and K
′ = Kj. Note that K and R are
being chosen by the challenger. The probability of a random K being equal
to a precomputed Ki is 2
−`2 . Similarly, the probability of a random R being
equal to a precomputed Rj is 2
−`3 . We obtain
Pr[(Y, Y ′) = (Xi, Xj)] = Pr[K = Ki]× Pr[R = Rj] = 2−`2−`3 .
As a result, we get
Pr[H(Xi) = H(Xj) and {Y, Y ′} = {Xi, Xj}] = 22toff−k−`2−`3 .
Considering all three cases, we conclude that
Pr[H(Y ) = H(Y ′)] = 2−k(1 + 22toff−`2−`3 + 2toff−`3).
The above discussion concludes the proof of Lemma 1. To reiterate the Lemma,
one can say that any player with computational complexity Toff = 2
toff against the
challenger of the ICRI game has a probability of success at most ε1 = 2
−k(1 +
22toff−`2−`3 + 2toff−`3).
We now define Interactive-Collision Resistance II.
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Definition 2. A hash function H is Interactive-Collision Resistant II (ICRII)
if the game of Fig. 3.7 is hard to win, for fixed values of `1, `2, and `3. The pair
(M‖K‖R′,M ′‖K ′‖R) is called an interactive-collision of type II. Furthermore, we
call H a (Toff , Ton, ε2)-ICRII hash function if an adversary with offline complexity
Toff and online complexity Ton wins the ICRII game with probability at most ε2.
Oscar challenger
Choose M , |M | = `1
M−−−−−−→
K←−−−−−− Choose K ∈ {0, 1}`2 uniformly at random
Choose M ′, |M ′| = `1
M ′−−−−−−→
Choose K′, |K′| = `2
K′−−−−−−→
R←−−−−−− Choose R ∈ {0, 1}`3 uniformly at random
Choose R′, |R′| = `3
R′−−−−−−→
Oscar wins if H(M‖K‖R′) = H(M ′‖K′‖R)
and M‖K‖R′ 6= M ′‖K′‖R.
Figure 3.7: ICRII Game
As in ICRI, if `2 = `3 = 0, then ICRII is equivalent to Collision Resistance. As
a result, we conclude that finding collisions is no harder than finding interactive-
collisions of type II. On the other hand, if `1 = `2 = 0, then ICRII is very close to
Second-Preimage Resistance (the lengths are fixed in the ICRII notion).
Similar to ICRI, we analyze the security of ICRII hash functions in the Random
Oracle Model to have an intuition on how difficult it is to win the ICRII game.
Lemma 2. Let X = {0, 1}`1+`2+`3 be the set of all possible binary strings of size
`1 + `2 + `3. Consider a hash function H chosen randomly from FX ,Y , where
|Y| = 2k. Then, H is a (2toff , 2ton , ε2)-ICRII hash function in the Random Oracle
Model, where ε2 = 2
−k(1 + 22toff−`2−`3 + 2toff−`3 + 2ton). In other words, any player
with offline computational complexity Toff = 2
toff and online complexity Ton = 2
ton
against the challenger of the ICRII game has a probability of success at most ε2 =
2−k(1 + 22toff−`2−`3 + 2toff−`2 + 2ton).
Proof of Lemma 2. Let H again be a Random Oracle and assume that the adver-
sary can access the Random Oracle for up to Toff = 2
toff times before he receives
the last flow from the challenger, i.e. the value of R in the ICRII. Furthermore, he
can access the Random Oracle for up to Ton = 2
ton times after he receives the last
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flow from the challenger and before he sends the value of R′. We now find an upper
bound on the probability ε2 of Oscar winning the ICRII game.
Let the pair (Y, Y ′) = (M‖K‖R′,M ′‖K ′‖R) be the interactive-collision of type
II found by Oscar. Further, let A = {X1, . . . , XToff} be Oscar’s inputs to the
Random Oracle before he receives the value of R from the challenger, and B =
{XToff+1, . . . , XToff+Ton} be his inputs to the Random Oracle after he received the
value of R. Without loss of generality, we assume that X1, . . . , XToff+Ton are all
distinct. We write each Xi in the form of Mi‖Ki‖Ri, where |Mi| = `1, |Ki| = `2
and |Ri| = `3.
We would like to find an upper bound on the probability of Oscar winning the
ICRII game. We will do this by considering the following mutually exclusive cases:
Case 1. Y ∈ B, that is, Y is one of the Ton values computed after the fifth flow;
Case 2. Y /∈ B and Y /∈ A, that is, Y is not among the Toff precomputed values or
the Ton values computed after the fifth flow;
Case 3. Y ∈ A, and Y ′ /∈ A, that is, Y is among the Toff precomputed values and Y ′
is not.
Case 4. Y ∈ A, and Y ′ ∈ A, that is, Y and Y ′ are both among the Toff precomputed
values.
Note that these mutually exclusive cases cover all possibilities. We now treat
each case separately.
Case 1. Once the challenger sends R, Y ′ is determined. Hence, the probability that
Y ′ collides with one of the Ton values that Oscar computes after receiving R
is 2ton−k. Oscar chooses Ton values that all begin with M‖K (from the first
two flows). Then, if a collision is found with Y ′, Oscar can choose R′ so that
Y collides with Y ′.
Case 2. In this case, Y is neither precomputed among the offline computations and nor
is it computed during the online computations. Note that Y ′ is determined
once the challenger sends R. The probability that Y , a value which is not
precomputed, collides with a determined value Y ′ is 2−k.
Case 3. This case refers to the situation where Y is computed among the offline com-
putations and Y ′ is not. Note that Y ′ is determined after the fifth flow. The
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probability that H(Y ′) = H(Xj), for some j ≤ Toff , is 2toff−k. Now, Oscar
wants Y = Xj. Therefore, he sends M = Mj and R
′ = Rj. We note that K
is chosen by the challenger. As a result,
Pr[Y = Xj] = Pr[K = Kj] = 2
−`2 .
Hence, the probability that H(Xj) = H(Y
′) and Y = Xj, when Y
′ is not a
precomputed value, is 2toff−k−`2 .
Case 4. If Y and Y ′ are both precomputed during the offline computations, then
Oscar has found a collision before starting the game. Let the colliding values
be denoted by Xi = Mi‖Ki‖Ri and Xj = Mj‖Kj‖Rj, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 2toff with




/2k. This is approximately equal to 22toff−k−1 for Toff = 2
toff .
After finding a collision in A, Oscar wants Y = Xi and Y ′ = Xj. Hence, he
lets M = Mi, R
′ = Ri,M
′ = Mj, and K
′ = Kj. Note that K and R are being
chosen by the challenger. The probability of a random K being equal to a
precomputed Ki is 2
−`2 . Similarly, the probability of a random R being equal
to a precomputed Rj is 2
−`3 . As a result, we obtain
Pr[(Y, Y ′) = (Xi, Xj)] = Pr[K = Ki]× Pr[R = Rj] = 2−`2−`3 .
As a result, we get
Pr[H(Xi) = H(Xj) and {Y, Y ′} = {Xi, Xj}] = 22toff−k−`2−`3 .
Summing up the above cases, we obtain that
Pr[H(Y ) = H(Y ′)] = 2−k(1 + 22toff−`2−`3 + 2toff−`2 + 2ton)
Next, we define Interactive-Collision Resistant III (ICRIII).
Definition 3. A hash function H is Interactive-Collision Resistant III (ICRIII)
if the game of Fig. 3.8 is hard to win, for fixed values of `1, `2, and `3. The pair
(M‖K‖R′,M ′‖K ′‖R) is called an interactive-collision of type III. Furthermore, we
call H a (Toff , Ton, ε3)-ICRIII hash function if an adversary with offline complexity
Toff and online complexity Ton wins the ICRIII game with probability at most ε3.
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Oscar challenger
Choose M ′, |M ′| = `1
M ′−−−−−−→
Choose K′, |K′| = `2
K′−−−−−−→
R←−−−−−− Choose R ∈ {0, 1}`3 uniformly at random
Choose M , |M | = `1
M−−−−−−→
K←−−−−−− Choose K ∈ {0, 1}`2 uniformly at random
Choose R′, |R′| = `3
R′−−−−−−→
Oscar wins if H(M‖K‖R′) = H(M ′‖K′‖R)
and M‖K‖R′ 6= M ′‖K′‖R.
Figure 3.8: ICRIII Game
Lemma 3. Let X = {0, 1}`1+`2+`3 be the set of all possible binary strings of size
`1 + `2 + `3. Consider a hash function H chosen randomly from FX ,Y , where
|Y| = 2k. Then, H is a (2toff , 2ton , ε3)-ICRIII hash function in the Random Oracle
Model, where ε3 = 2
−k(1 + 22toff−`2−`3 + 2toff−`3 + 2ton). In other words, any player
with offline computational complexity Toff = 2
toff and online complexity Ton = 2
ton
against the challenger of the ICRIII game has a probability of success at most ε3 =
2−k(1 + 22toff−`2−`3 + 2toff−`2 + 2ton).
The proof of Lemma 3 is similar to the proof of Lemma 2.
Finally, we define the notion of an Interactive-Collision Resistant hash function.
Definition 4. A hash function H is Interactive-Collision Resistant (ICR) if
the ICRI, ICRII, and ICRIII games are all hard to win.
Furthermore, H is said to be a (Toff , Ton, ε1, ε2)-ICR hash function if it is a
(Toff , ε1)-ICRI hash function, a (Toff , Ton, ε2)-ICRII hash function, and a (Toff , Ton, ε2)-
ICRIII hash function.
3.3.2 A New IMAP Using ICR Hash Functions
Let H be a (Toff , Ton, ε1, ε2)-ICR hash function with fixed parameters `1, `2, and `3.
We propose the following IMAP:
1. On input (M , Bob), Alice chooses K ∈ {0, 1}`2 uniformly at random and
sends M‖K to Bob over the insecure channel.
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2. Bob receives M ′‖K ′.
3. Bob chooses R ∈ {0, 1}`3 uniformly at random and he sends it to Alice.
4. Alice receives R′.
5. Alice computes h = H(M‖K‖R′) and sends it over the authenticated channel.
5. Bob receives h′.
6. Bob computes H(M ′‖K ′‖R).
7. Bob outputs (Alice, M ′) if h′ = H(M ′‖K ′‖R), and he rejects otherwise.
This IMAP is illustrated in Fig. 3.9. Next, we prove that this IMAP is secure
under the assumption that the three games in Figures 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8 are hard to
win. In other words, if H is a (Toff , Ton, ε1, ε2)-ICR hash function, then the IMAP
is secure.
Alice Bob
Input (M , Bob)
Choose K ∈R {0, 1}`2
M‖K
−−−−→ Receive M ′‖K′
R←−−−− Choose R ∈R {0, 1}`3
Receive R′ and
Compute h = H(M‖K‖R′) h===⇒ Output (Alice, M ′) if h = H(M ′‖K′‖R),
and reject otherwise.
Figure 3.9: Interactive Message Authentication Protocol
3.3.3 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of the IMAP presented in Fig. 3.9. We
consider substitution and impersonation attacks separately. Associated with each
attack scenario, an IMAP game is introduced. Winning this game is equivalent
to attacking our proposed IMAP. Finally, the reduction of the ICRI, and similarly
ICRII and ICRIII, to the IMAP game is shown.
As was mentioned earlier, the ACPA model consists of an information gathering
stage and the deception stage.
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3.3.3.1 The Information Gathering Stage
During the information gathering stage, the adversary can change the information
sent over the broadband channel. For instance, the adversary may change R to R′,
or K to K ′. The other value that is being sent over the broadband channel is the
message M . However, our model allows the adversary to choose the message M to
start with. Hence, there is no need for the adversary to intervene and change it to
M ′. Since we are working in the ACPA model, the adversary can make Alice send
q messages in the information gathering stage. This stage is depicted in Fig. 3.10.
Alice Eve Bob




Compute h1 = H(M1‖K1‖R′1)
h1=======================⇒













Compute hq = H(Mq‖Kq‖R′q)
hq
========================⇒
Figure 3.10: Information Gathering Phase of an Attack
As mentioned previously, the goal of the adversary in attacking a MAP is to
make the verifier, Bob, accept a message M ′ along with the identity of the claimant,
Alice, when he was supposed to reject and, indeed, the message M ′ was never sent
by Alice to Bob. There are two main ways of achieving this goal: by mounting
impersonation attacks or substitution attacks. We will prove that a successful
impersonation attack translates into winning the ICRI game and a successful sub-
stitution attack is equivalent to winning either the ICRII game or the ICRIII game.
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3.3.3.2 Impersonation Attack
Figure 3.11 depicts the impersonation attack against our IMAP. Here, the attacker
initiates a session herself and tries to convince Bob that a message M ′ is sent from
Alice, while in fact M ′ was generated by the attacker and Alice never sent M ′ to
Bob. This attack is analogous to an attack of type AABB depicted in Fig. 3.3.
Eve Bob
Input (M ′, Bob)
M ′‖K′
−−−−→ Receive M ′‖K′
R′←−−−− Choose R′ ∈ {0, 1}`2
Receive R′ uniformly at random
Send h = hi = H(Mi‖Ki‖R′i) for
h
===⇒ Output (Alice, M ′) if h = H(M ′‖K′‖R′), for
some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ q. and reject otherwise.
Figure 3.11: An Impersonation Attack Against IMAP
According to our model, the data sent over the authenticated channel, although
public, cannot be modified by the adversary. Hence, Eve can only replay a previous
flow sent by Alice, as shown in Fig. 3.11. The attacker replays one of h1, . . . , hq.
Given that Alice has never sent M ′, the adversarial goal is achieved if Bob accepts.
IMAP Game Against Impersonation Attacks. We now prove that our IMAP
is secure against impersonation attacks mounted by an adversary who has offline
computational power Toff given that H is a (Toff , ε1)-ICRI hash function. In other
words, an adversary who can attack the IMAP by mounting an impersonation at-
tack with non-negligible probability can also win the ICRI game with non-negligible
probability.
Consider the game illustrated in Fig. 3.12. If Eve wins this game with proba-
bility ε, then obviously we can translate the game into an attack against our IMAP
with success probability ε. As a result, this game is named the “IMAP game”.
Here, Eve is simulating the adversary of the IMAP and is facing a challenger who
is simulating Alice and Bob at the same time.
The first q rounds, analogous to the information gathering stage of an attack,
consist of Eve sending messages Mi and the challenger responding with Ki. This
part is simulating the first flow sent by Alice.
Eve is allowed to change the values sent by Alice and Bob sent over the insecure
channel, that is Ki and Ri. Note that hi = H(Mi‖Ki‖R′i). Hence, the values of K ′i
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Define hi = H(Mi‖Ki‖R′i)
hi−−−−−−−−−→ Eve wins if M ′ /∈ {M1, . . . , Mq}
for some i ∈ {1, . . . , q} and hi = H(M ′‖K′‖R).
Figure 3.12: IMAP Game Against Impersonation Attacks
and Ri are redundant in the analysis of the impersonation attack.
In the last round of the game, corresponding to the deception phase, Eve sends
M ′‖K ′, M ′ 6= Mi for every i ∈ {1, . . . , q}. After receiving a random value R from
the challenger, she sends hi = H(Mi‖Ki‖R′i), for some i ∈ {1, . . . , q}. Eve wins the
game if hi = H(M
′‖K ′‖R) for M ′ /∈ {M1, . . . ,Mq}.
The following theorem reduces the ICRI game to the IMAP game against im-
personation attacks.
Theorem 2. Let H be a (Toff , ε1)-ICRI hash function. Then, any adversary against
the IMAP of Fig. 3.9 with offline complexity Toff who makes q message queries and
mounts an impersonation attack, has a probability of success at most qε1.
Proof. Assuming that Eve wins the IMAP game of Fig. 3.12 with non-negligible
probability, we can employ her in the ICRI game depicted in Fig. 3.6. In this
reduction, Eve is playing against her IMAP game challenger and Oscar is playing
against his ICRI game challenger. The result of the IMAP game, played by Eve, is
going to be used in the ICRI game, played by Oscar. Oscar begins by choosing a
random value j ∈ {1, . . . , q}. Then, he lets Eve continue playing against the IMAP
challenger, which is simulated by Oscar. Oscar does not interrupt the flows between
Eve and her challenger except when t = j. For t = j, Oscar forwards Mj to the
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ICRI challenger. Then, the challenger responds with K. Oscar sends K = Kj to
Eve. Oscar gets R′ from Eve and sends it to the ICRI challenger.
At the deception stage, Eve sends M ′ and K ′. Oscar sends M ′ to his challenger
and receives R. He then sends R to Eve. Eve responds with a value hi, i ∈
{1, . . . , q}. Eve wins if hi = H(M ′‖K ′‖R). If i = j and Eve wins, then Oscar wins
the ICRI game, and Oscar loses otherwise.
If we assume that Eve can win the IMAP game with probability ε, then Oscar
wins the ICRI game with probability ε/q.
When q = 1, adversaries with probability of success 2−k clearly exist, and hence,
the reduction is tight. For q 6= 1, the probability of success is q2−k. This factor
q appears as a consequence of considering strong adversaries who can request q
messages to be sent by Alice. Some papers only consider q = 1 resulting in a
weaker notion of security.1 However, the approach of many other papers is similar
to this thesis. For instance, Vaudenay [Vau05] assumed that q ≤ 210 and the
reduction is not tight. They also get the same probability of success, p/q.
Putting Lemma 1 and Theorem 2 together, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 2. Let X = {0, 1}`1+`2+`3 be the set of all possible binary strings of
size `1 + `2 + `3 and H be a hash function chosen randomly from FX ,Y , where
|Y| = 2k. Then, any adversary against the IMAP of Fig. 3.9, with offline complexity
Toff = 2
toff who makes up to q message queries and mounts an impersonation attack,
has a probability of success p ≤ q2−k(1 + 22toff−`2−`3 + 2toff−`2).
3.3.3.3 Substitution Attack
In the substitution attack, unlike the case of impersonation attack, Alice is actively
involved and she would like to authenticate M to Bob. The adversary, on the other
hand, wishes to authenticate M ′ to Bob along with the identity of Alice. There are
two possible cases.
The first case is when Alice initiates a session and tries to authenticate M to
Bob. Then, Eve substitutes M ′ for M . As a result, Bob receives M ′ and not M .
The value of M ′ may be the result of a partial or total modification of M by Eve.
After receiving R from Bob, Eve tries to find a suitable value R′ which will make
Bob accept after receiving h. Figure 3.13 is illustrating this scenario against our
IMAP. This substitution attack is an attack of type ABAB, depicted in Figure 3.3.
1See [NSS06] for instance.
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Alice Eve Bob






Compute h = H(M‖K‖R′) h==================⇒ If H(M ′‖K′‖R) = h, output
(Alice, M ′), reject otherwise.
Figure 3.13: Substitution Attack of Type ABAB Against Our IMAP
The second case is when Eve initiates a flow with Bob while pretending to
be Alice. Eve tries to authenticate M ′ to Bob. After receiving R, she does her
computations to find a suitable M . Then, she will make Alice initiate a session
with Bob with input M . Eve will use the authenticated flow of this session in her
original session with Bob. This substitution attack is an attack of type BAAB,
illustrated in Fig. 3.5.
Alice Eve Bob








Compute h = H(M‖K‖R′) h==================⇒ If H(M ′‖K′‖R) = h, output
(Alice, M ′), reject otherwise.
Figure 3.14: Substitution Attack of Type BAAB Against Our IMAP
The IMAP Game Against Substitution Attacks. Examining the substitu-
tion attack of type ABAB, illustrated in Fig. 3.13, we can write down the following
as the order of the flows:
(1) Alice chooses M or gets it from Eve. Eve gets K from Alice.
(2) Eve sends M ′ and K ′ to Bob.
(3) Bob chooses a random value R and sends it to Eve.
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(4) Eve chooses a random value R′ and sends it to Alice.
(5) Alice computes h = H(M‖K‖R′), which is sent to Bob.
Note that a successful substitution attack of type ABAB directly translates
into a successful player against the ICRII game. As a result, we get the following
theorem.
Theorem 3. Let H be a (Toff , Ton, ε2)-ICRII hash function. Then, any adversary
against our IMAP with offline complexity Toff and online complexity Ton, who is
mounting a substitution attack of type A has a probability of success p = ε2.
Now we examine the substitution attack of type BAAB, illustrated in Fig. 3.14.
The following is the order of the flows as they happen in this attack scenario:
(1) Eve sends M ′ and K ′ to Bob.
(2) Bob chooses a random value R and sends it to Eve.
(3) Eve provides Alice with M .
(4) Alice sends M and K to Eve.
(5) Eve chooses a random value R′ and sends it to Alice.
(6) Alice computes h = H(M‖K‖R′), which is sent to Bob.
A successful substitution attack of type BAAB yields a successful player against
the ICRIII game. Hence, the following theorem follows.
Theorem 4. Let H be a (Toff , Ton, ε2)-ICRIII hash function. Then, any adversary
against our IMAP with offline complexity Toff and online complexity Ton, who is
mounting a substitution attack of type BAAB has a probability of success p = ε2.
Now combining Lemmas 2 and 3 with Theorems 3 and 4, we obtain the following
corollary.
Corollary 3. Let X = {0, 1}`1+`2+`3 be the set of all possible binary strings of size
`1 + `2 + `3 and H be a hash function chosen randomly from FX ,Y , where |Y| = 2k.
Then, any adversary against our IMAP, with offline complexity Toff = 2
toff and
online complexity Ton = 2
ton, who is mounting a substitution attack, has a probability
of success p = 2−k(1 + 22toff−`2−`3 + 2toff−`3 + 2ton).
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3.3.3.4 Security of our IMAP
The adversary against our IMAP will either mount a substitution attack or an
impersonation attack. Hence, the following theorem is a consequence of Corollary
2 and Corollary 3.
Theorem 5. Let X = {0, 1}`1+`2+`3 and H be a hash function chosen randomly
from FX ,Y , where |Y| = 2k. Then, any adversary against our IMAP, with offline
complexity Toff = 2
toff and online complexity Ton = 2
ton who can make q message
queries, has a probability of success
p ≤ 2−k max(q(1 + 22toff−`2−`3 + 2toff−`2), 1 + 22toff−`2−`3 + 2toff−`3 + 2ton).
3.3.4 The Choice of Parameters and Hash Function
Theorem 5 says that an adversary attacking our proposed IMAP, using 2toff hash
computations before the deception stage, 2ton hash computations during the decep-
tion stage, and q message queries, has a probability of success at most 2−k max(q(1+
22toff−`2−`3 + 2toff−`2), 1 + 22toff−`2−`3 + 2toff−`3 + 2ton).
Let us first target typical2 values for q ≤ 210, toff ≤ 70, and p ≤ 2−20.
If we take `2, `3 ≥ 80, then we can basically ignore the factors (1 + 22toff−`2−`3)
and 2toff−`3 . We note that, since R and K are being sent over the insecure channel,
this assumption does not have any impact on the analysis or usefulness of our
protocol. We now can simplify the result of Theorem 5 to p ≤ 2−k max(q, 2ton).
Since we want the overall success probability of the adversary to be less than
or equal to 2−20, we require that max(q, 2ton) ≤ 2k−20.
Hence, letting ton = 10 along with typical parameters q ≤ 210, toff ≤ 70, and
p ≤ 2−20, we get that k ≥ 30. This is a distinct improvement over the previous
works.
Vaudenay [Vau05] requires k ≥ 50 while the same typical parameters are tar-
geted. If we let k = 50, then we can tolerate much stronger adversaries, compared
to other results [Vau05, MS07, PV06], having ton = 30 and q ≤ 230 and still get
the same overall success probability of p ≤ 2−20. Note that, we can allow toff to get
bigger as well by just choosing `2 + `3 according to the size of toff .
2See for instance [Vau05] and [PV06].
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As a concrete suggestion, we would propose to use a standard hash function
such as SHA-256, with the output truncated to k bits. This would certainly be
practical. The issue remains as to whether it would be secure. We have proved that
the protocol is secure in the Random Oracle Model, which is a standard approach in
the design of cryptographic protocols. Furthermore, we also determined the exact
properties of a hash function that are required for the security proof to hold. Of
course we are not able to prove that these properties hold for any specific hash
function. On the other hand, no one is able to prove at the present time that any
specific hash function satisfies any desirable property (e.g., preimage-resistance).
However, assuming a CR hash function is enough for ICRI, ICRII, and ICRIII
properties to hold. As a result, if we are comfortable with using a concrete hash
function in practice in place of a CR hash function, then we can also be comfortable
with using that hash function when ICR hash functions are needed.
In practice, there needs to be a relation between the size of the messages M ,
`1, and the choice of ton. Note that, in a substitution attack the adversary is
making 2ton hash computations while Alice is waiting to get a value R from Bob.
Generating a random value R does not take long. For our application, in particular,
these devices are in close proximity and as a results the delay in the system should
be low as well. This means that when Alice does not hear back from Bob, she
suspects that some active adversary is trying to intervene.
3.4 An Unconditionally Secure IMAP
Naor, Segev and Smith [NSS06] proposed an unconditionally secure IMAP, with k
rounds, using evaluation of polynomials over finite fields, for every integer k. To
authenticate an n-bit message in k rounds, they require the length of the authenti-
cated string to be about 2 log(1/ε) + 2 log(k−1) n+O(1), where ε is the probability
of success of the adversary. The length of the authenticated string over the narrow-
band channel is 2 log(1/ε) + O(1) when k = log(n). Moreover, they proved that
their protocol is essentially optimal by proving a lower bound of 2 log(1/ε)−6 on the
required length of the authenticated string. This result implies that the advantage
of assuming computational security versus unconditional security is to reduce the
amount of information that needs to be manually authenticated and not to reduce
the number of rounds.
As with other protocols introduced in this chapter, we focus on unconditionally
secure IMAPs with k = 3. We find sufficient conditions for an IMAP with three
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rounds to be unconditionally secure. On the one hand, our work is a special case
of the work done by Naor et al. since we are only looking at protocols with three
rounds. On the other hand, it is a generalization of their work because we do not
limit ourselves to a particular polynomial construction over finite fields.
Let M be the set of all messages, let K be the set of all possible keys, and let
H be a set of keyed hash functions of the form hy :M→ Fq for y ∈ K. Figure 3.15
illustrates a generalization of the protocol proposed by Naor et al.
Alice Bob
Input (M , Bob)
Choose x ∈ Fq uniformly at random
M, x
−−−−→ Receive M ′, x′
y
←−−−− Choose y ∈ K uniformly at random
Receive y′ and
Compute t = hy′ (M) + x
y′, t
===⇒ Output (Alice, M ′) if y = y′ and
t = hy(M ′) + x′, reject otherwise.
Figure 3.15: A Generalization of Naor-Segev-Smith IMAP
In order to analyze these attacks, we need the following standard definition for
ε−∆U hash families.
Definition 5. A hash family H is an ε − ∆U hash family if for all choices of
M,M ′ ∈M and x ∈ Fq,
Pr[hy(M)− hy(M ′) = x] ≤ ε,
where the probability is over all random choices of y.
For the protocol presented in Fig. 3.15, y is chosen uniformly at random from
K. Next, we examine each possible attack in more detail.
In a BAAB attack, Eve is required to set y = y′, otherwise she will be detected.
She is successful if and only if
hy′(M) + x = hy′(M
′) + x′.
In other words, Eve succeeds if and only if x = hy′(M
′) + x′ − hy′(M). Since x is
randomly chosen by Alice after y′ is chosen by Bob, Eve succeeds with probability
2−q.
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In an AABB attack, on the other hand, Eve first receives M,x and has to guess
the key y′ ahead of time in order to set y = y′. Later, she can choose M ′ and x
such that hy(M) +x = hy(M
′) +x′. The probability that Eve guesses the right key
y′ is 1/|K|.
Finally, in an ABAB attack, Eve receives M,x and fixes M ′, x′ before y′ is
chosen by Bob. She is successful if and only if hy′(M) + x = hy′(M
′) + x′, or
hy′(M) − hy′(M ′) = x′ − x. Note that, x′ − x is fixed. Hence, if H is an ε − ∆U
hash family, then Eve succeeds with probability at most ε.
If we summarize the above three attacks, we see that Eve succeeds with proba-
bility max{ε, 2−q, |K|−1}, and the size of the authenticator is log2 |K|+ q bits. Note
that there are 2−q different possibilities for the value of x. Hence, we have ε ≥ 2−q
and we can conclude that Eve’s success probability is
max{ε, |K|−1}.
The protocol proposed by Naor et al. [NSS06] is a special case of our construc-
tion, where the ε − ∆U hash family is constructed from a Reed-Solomon code.
We now briefly describe their construction for a k-round protocol. For a message




For distinct messages m,m′ ∈ (Fq)k and for any constants c, c′ ∈ Fq, we obtain
Pr
x∈RFq
[Cx(m) + c = Cx(m
′) + c′] ≤ k
q
.
The polynomial C(.) is used as a hash function k times, once in each round. Each
application of the hash function results in a shorter message. After k applications,
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We look at the problem of message and entity recognition by reviewing the
definitions and the security model described in the literature. In Section 4.1, we
prove that there is a one-to-one correspondence between non-interactive message
recognition protocols and digital signature schemes with message recovery. Further,
in Section 4.2, we examine previous recognition protocols proposed in the literature
[ABC+98, HWGW05, LZWW05, Mit03, WW03], and conclude that the protocol
of Lucks et al. [LZWW05] is more suitable compared to other proposals in the
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literature. Hence, we look at this protocol in more detail and we will refer to it as the
Lucks protocol for short. In Section 4.3, we suggest a variant to overcome a certain
shortcoming. In particular, the Lucks protocol is not equipped with a practical
resynchronization process and can fail to resume in case of communication failure
or adversarial disruption. We propose [MS08c] a variant of this protocol which
is equipped with a resynchronization technique that allows users to resynchronize
whenever they wish or when they suspect an intrusion.
On the other hand, it is also of interest to remedy this shortcoming without
requiring a separate synchronization procedure. In Section 4.4, we propose a new
message recognition protocol [GMS08], which is based on the original protocol by
Lucks et al., and incorporates the resynchronization technique within the protocol
itself. That is, without having to provide a separate resynchronization procedure,
we overcome the recoverability problem of the protocol. Moreover, we analyze all
possible attacks against our protocol and prove that they can succeed with negligible
probability. We further prove the security of the protocol in the model described
in Section 1.3, and its ability to self-recover once the disruption has stopped.
Finally, in Section 4.5, we propose a message recognition protocol without the
use of hash chains [MS08b] which is suitable for ad hoc pervasive networks. Hence,
we no longer require the devices to save values of a hash chain in their memories.
This relaxes the memory requirements. Moreover, we do not need to upperbound
the total number of times the protocol can be executed which implies a desired
flexibility in this regard. Furthermore, our protocol is secure without having to
consider families of assumptions that depend on the number of times the protocol
is executed. Hence, the security does not weaken as the protocol is executed over
time. Last but not least, we provide a practical procedure for resynchronization in
case of any adversarial disruption or communication failure.
4.1 Non-interactive MRPs
In this section, we prove that there is a one-to-one correspondence between non-
interactive message recognition protocols and digital signature schemes with mes-
sage recovery.
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4.1.1 A General Non-Interactive MRP
A general non-interactive message recognition protocol, where all flows are going
from Alice to Bob, consists of two flows. The first flow is the initialization step
which happens only once. The second flow, occurring over the insecure channel,
is sent once for each message to be authenticated. As a result, the message and
its commitment (and possibly some other information) are all being transmitted
in one flow. Hence, one should not reveal keys, such as ai in the hash chain, in
these protocols (otherwise, the adversary having seen the revealed key will stop this
single flow and commit to a message of her own using this key). This implies that
there is no point in using hash chains or any form of chains in the non-interactive
setting since the chains can only be useful when you actually reveal them.
Figure 4.1 depicts a general non-interactive message recognition protocol. On
input (1k), where k is a security parameter, the function f outputs a pair of keys
(a,A). In order to make impersonation impossible, it should be hard to find a given
the value of A. The protocol is described in terms of two functions, denoted by
compose and decompose. The function compose can be a randomized algorithm.
Note that any non-interactive protocol can be put in this form. It is required that
decompose(c′, A) =⊥ with high probability if c′ 6= compose(M,a) for some message
M and a valid pair of keys (a,A). Moreover, it is required that decompose(c, A) =
M when c = compose(M,a).
Alice Eve Bob




Input (M , Bob)
compose(M, a) = c
c−−−−→ Receive c′
Compute d = decompose(c′, A)
If d = M ′, a valid message,
output (M ′, Alice), otherwise, reject.
Figure 4.1: A Non-interactive Message Recognition Protocol
4.1.2 Digital Signature Schemes with Message Recovery
Digital signature schemes with message recovery (DSSMR), Fig 4.2, are often for-
mulated by three algorithms: key generation, sign and verify. The key generation
algorithm G randomly produces a pair of public and private keys (PK, SK) for each
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signer. The signer uses SK to sign and PK is used by others to verify signatures.
On input message M and a secret key SK, the signing algorithm S, which may be
randomized, outputs a signature s. On input public key PK and a signature s, the
signature verifying algorithm, V , either outputs M ′, a valid message, or it rejects
s.
Alice Eve Bob
compute G(1k) = (SK, PK) PK===⇒ Receive PK.
Alice Eve Bob
Input (M , Bob)
S(M, SK) = s s−−−−→ Receive s′
Compute M̃ = V(s′, PK)
If M̃ = M ′ is a valid message,
output (M ′, Alice), otherwise, reject.
Figure 4.2: A Digital Signature Scheme with Message Recovery
A signature s of M that is honestly computed, using the secret key SK, should
be accepted by the verifying algorithm using the associated public key PK. In
other words, for all M,PK, and SK, it holds that V(PK,S(M,SK)) = M. Fur-
ther, it should be difficult for any polynomially bounded adversary, to forge valid
signature(s) knowing only the public key PK, and the three algorithms.
4.1.3 Equivalence of Non-interactive MRPs and DSSMRs
Given the aforementioned definitions and properties, we obtain the following ob-
vious result on the equivalence of digital signature schemes with message recovery
and non-interactive message recognition protocols.
Theorem 6. Given functions f , compose, and decompose, any non-interactive
message recognition protocol can be transformed to a digital signature scheme with
message recovery. Conversely, any digital signature scheme with message recov-
ery, with functions G,S, and V, can be transformed to a non-interactive message
recognition protocol.
By letting SK := a, G := f , S := compose, and V := decompose, the forward
statement clearly follows. Similarly, the converse statement follows by letting a :=
SK, f := G, compose := S, and decompose := V .
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Note that it was previously known that any signature scheme could be used to
construct a non-interactive recognition protocol, which is a more general case of
the converse statement of the theorem. However, the forward result is new.
4.2 Previous MRPs
In this section, we review the existing protocols in the literature which provide entity
or message recognition. The usability of each protocol is discussed in the context
of networks with devices having low computation power and low communication
bandwidth.
The ‘Guy Fawkes protocol’ was proposed by Anderson et al. [ABC+98]. There
are two variants of this protocol suggested and a one-way hash function is deployed
in both variants. In the first variant, random codewords, Xi, are chosen in each
session and are refreshed each time a message, Mi, is authenticated. Alice commits
to the message and the codewords and then publishes the commitment in a public
directory which provides time-stamping services. Later, she reveals the committed
values to prove that she is the same party who was involved in previous sessions.
However, assuming the existence of a trusted party which provides time-stamping
services is not realistic in most ad hoc network scenarios. The second variant does
not require any interaction with a time-stamping provider and instead requires in-
teraction of the authenticating party with the verifying party. The initialization
phase of this protocol does not assume any authenticated channel; however, it re-
quires digital signatures for authenticating the first blocks and codewords. This
may not be suitable in ad hoc networks and, in particular, in low-power environ-
ments. Moreover, for a message to be authenticated in session i, users need to
commit to it in the previous session. In the context of message recognition, this
means that users are engaged in two sessions of this protocol to authenticate a
single message, which may not be desirable.
An entity recognition protocol, known as ‘Remote User Authentication Proto-
col’, was introduced by Mitchell [Mit03]. In this protocol, a message authentication
code (MAC) is used to prove that a user is the same entity involved in previous
sessions. The protocol can be adapted to perform message recognition as well; how-
ever, this is not discussed in the paper. The setup phase of this protocol requires
that t MAC values be sent over the authenticated channel. This may be costly
since authenticated channels are usually of low bandwidth. Further, the “cut-and-
choose” procedure in each round involves in sending 2t MAC values and r secret
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keys. In order for the protocol to be secure, it is suggested that t ≥ 35 and r ≈ t/2.
Hence, the amount of computation and communication here is large compared to
other protocols that are providing entity or message recognition and it may not be
suitable for settings with low power devices.
Weimerskirch et al. introduced a protocol called ‘Zero Common-Knowledge’
(ZCK) protocol [WW03]. They use MACs and hash chains of the form ai = h(ai−1)
and bi = h(bi−1), i = 1, . . . , n, as keys for the MACs computed by Alice and Bob,
respectively. Here, n is fixed at the beginning and h is a one-way hash function.
Hammell et al. implemented the ZCK protocol [HWGW05]. The provided mea-
surements and observations from this implementation gave a proof-of-concept. Low
computational power, low code space, low communication bandwidth, low energy
resources, are among the main requirements of a recognition protocol designed for
an ad hoc pervasive network setting. The measurements resulted from this imple-
mentation proved that the ZCK protocol exhibits the aforementioned requirements.
Note that Hammell et al. [HWGW05] investigate the practicality of the ZCK
protocol but do not investigate its security properties. That is, Hammell et al. rely
on the security proof presented by Weimerskirch et al. [WW03]. However, Lucks
et al. found a flaw in the security proof of this protocol and presented an attack
against the ZCK protocol. Furthermore, they proposed a modification to fix the
flaw.
4.2.1 The Lucks Protocol
As noted above, Lucks et al. [LZWW05] found an attack against the ZCK protocol
and pointed out the flaw in the security proof of this protocol. Further, using
the same idea of using values in a hash chain as keys for MACs, they proposed a
message recognition protocol which is a modification of the original ZCK protocol.
They consider a cryptographic hash function h : {0, 1}s → {0, 1}s as a one-way
hash function, and a message authentication code MAC : {0, 1}s×{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}c.
Typical values are suggested to be s ≥ 80 and c ≥ 30. Further, n is fixed to
be the maximum number of messages to be authenticated. In other words, the
maximum number of sessions is fixed to be n. Alice and Bob randomly choose a0
and b0, respectively. Then, they respectively form ai = h(ai−1) and bi = h(bi−1),
i = 1, . . . , n. In the initialization phase, Eve is assumed to be passive. Hence, we
can denote this channel, in accordance with our notation, by ⇒. Alice and Bob
will exchange an and bn over the authenticated channel during this phase.
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Alice Bob
Choose a random a0 and Choose a random b0 and
compute ai = H(ai−1) for i = 1, . . . , n
an===⇒ compute bi = H(bi−1) for i = 1, . . . , n.
bn⇐===
Figure 4.3: Initialization Phase of the Lucks Recognition Protocol
After the initialization phase, there are n sessions denoted by n − 1, . . . , 0,
starting from session n − 1 and moving down to lower values one at a time. In
session i, Alice authenticates the message mi using ai as the key for the MAC. Once
Bob authenticates himself to Alice by revealing bi, Alice reveals ai and allows Bob
to verify and accept this new key and the authenticity of the message mi. When a
key k is accepted, it is denoted by accept-key(k). Moreover, commit-message(m, i)
indicates that Alice commits to a message m in session i, and accept-message(m, i)
indicates that Bob accepts m as authentic and fresh in session i. After a successful
session of the protocol, Alice and Bob will “move down” in the hash chain, using
ai−1 and bi−1 for session i− 1.
Alice’s internal state in the Lucks protocol is as follows:
• i, the session counter
• bi+1, the most recently accepted value of Bob’s hash chain (hence accept-
key(bi+1) has occurred already)
• a one-bit flag, to distinguish the program states A0 and A1.
Similarly, Bob’s internal state is:
• i, the session counter
• ai+1, the most recently accepted value of Alice’s hash chain (hence accept-
key(ai+1) has occurred already)
• a one-bit flag, to distinguish the program states B0 and B1.
Session i of the Lucks protocol:
A0 (Alice’s initial program state) Obtain mi (possibly from Eve), then
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Commit-message(mi, i).
Compute di = MACai(mi).
Send (di,mi); goto A1.
A1 Wait for a message b′ (supposedly from Bob), then
If H(b′) = bi+1 then
Let bi := b
′, accept-key(bi) and send ai. Let i := i− 1 and goto A0
else goto A1.
B0 (Bob’s initial program state) Wait for a message (di,mi), then send bi and
goto B1.
B1 Wait for a message a′ (supposedly from Alice), then
If H(a′) = ai+1 then
Let ai := a
′ and accept-key(ai).
If MACa′(mi) = di then
Accept mi as authentic in session i
(else do not accept any message for session i).
Let i := i− 1 and goto B0
else goto B1.
Figure 4.4 depicts the Lucks protocol. We analyze this protocol in more detail
and point out its shortcomings in case of adversarial disruption or communication
failure. Further, we propose a new variant of the recognition protocol of Lucks et
al. which incorporates a resynchronization technique allowing a full recoverability
of the protocol.
Lucks et al. present their protocol in an extended abstract [LZWW05], and prove
its security in the full version of the paper [LZWW07]. An updated version of this
proof is also published in [LZWW08]. The protocol is proved to be secure given
that the the following properties hold for the hash function H and the message
authentication code MAC.
Definition 6. Let secret y0, y1, . . . , yi and known yi+1 be chosen such that yi+1 =
H(yi), yi = H(yi−1), . . . , y1 = H(y0). A hash function H is referred to as a depth-
i preimage resistant (i-PR) hash function when it is infeasible to find y′ such
that yi+1 = H(y
′).
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di = MACai (mi)
mi, di−−−−→ Receive m′i, d′i
bi←−−−−
Receive b′i and




else wait for a new bi
ai−−−−→ Receive a′i




else wait for a new ai.




If so, accept-message(m′i, i).
Figure 4.4: The Lucks Entity and Message Recognition Protocol
Definition 7. Let secret y0, y1, . . . , yi−1 and known yi, yi+1 be chosen such that
yi+1 = H(yi), yi = H(yi−1), . . . , y1 = H(y0). A hash function H is depth-i
second preimage resistant (i-SPR) when it is infeasible to find y′, y′ 6= yi,
such that yi+1 = H(y
′).
Definition 8. Let secret y0, y1, . . . , yi and known yi+1 be chosen such that yi+1 =
H(yi), yi = H(yi−1), . . . , y1 = H(y0). A message authentication code MAC is
depth-i existentially unforgeable if it is infeasible to mount an existential
forgery against MACyi in an adaptive chosen message attack scenario.
4.2.1.1 Unrecoverability Problem of the Luck Protocol
There is a “small time-frame” associated with each session i. In particular, a
message mi is fresh if it is sent within the associated time-frame of session i. It
is assumed that during each time-frame, Alice commits to only one message and
Bob accepts at most one message. As a result, the time-frame should be known to
both Alice and Bob. However, the value i, which could indicate the appropriate
time-frame, is contained in the internal states of Alice and Bob. Note that i is
not being transmitted during the protocol execution and it is implicit that Alice’s
and Bob’s internal states agree on this value. This may be problematic in different
ways. First, how will Alice and Bob remain synchronized during the different
time-frames? Assuming a secure synchronized clock is a quick fix to this problem.
However, assuming availability of such a service may not be practical for most
ad hoc network scenarios. In particular, Lucks et al. assume that no securely
synchronized clock is available. Hence, the process of synchronization is highly
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dependent on the schedule of received and sent messages, that is, on the dynamics
of the communication in the network. This gives rise to the second problem: in case
of communication failure or adversarial disruption, this protocol is not equipped
with a practical resynchronization process.
We observe that although the Lucks protocol is provably secure, it nonetheless
falls short in case of the following adversarial disruption. Eve can easily manipulate
one party to move forward to the next session, while the other party is still in the
previous session. In such a case, a party could get trapped in a state and never be
able to finish execution of a session; as a result, he or she remains stuck in that
state forever. It is also mentioned in [LZWW08] that Eve is able to stretch a session
at her will.
Figure 4.5 illustrates a situation where Bob is trapped by Eve in program state
B1. The condition in program state B1 fails since ai+1 6= H(a′i). This will cause
Bob to stay in B1 waiting for a new ai. Now even if Alice sends him a legitimate
message mi, he will ignore it. Although this looks like a denial of service attack,
it is much stronger than that. Eve can go away and yet Alice and Bob are still
unable to communicate because Bob is trapped. The details of the disruption are
as follows.
Eve sends m′i and d
′
i to Bob and he will automatically decrement his index to i
while Alice does not. Eve chooses a′i such that ai+1 6= H(a′i), which will make Bob
wait for a new ai. While he is waiting for a new ai, he will not accept a message of
the form (mj, dj), for any j. Hence, even if Alice sends him a legitimate message,
he will ignore it. As a result, he is “trapped” in state B1.
Lucks et al. [LZWW05] suggest that Bob sends bi again after he has waited for
too long to receive the correct ai. However, when Alice has not initiated the session
and is not anticipating bi, it is not clear what she is supposed to do. Hence, this
will not help the protocol recover in case of this particular disruption.
Eve Bob





i−−−−→ Move to the next time-frame upon reception of
the new message.
bi←−−−−
Choose a′i such that ai+1 6= H(a′i).
a′i−−−−→ Since ai+1 6= H(a′i), wait for a new ai.
Figure 4.5: Eve “trapping” Bob in state B1
Eve can play the same trick with Alice and trap her in program state A1 for
an indeterminate period of time; Figure 4.6 illustrates this situation.
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Compute di = MACai (mi).
mi, di−−−−→
Since bi+1 6= H(b′i), wait for a new bi.
b′i←−−−− Choose b′i such that bi+1 6= H(b′i).
Figure 4.6: Eve “trapping” Alice in state A1
Once again, we note that this inability to recover is a problem since the adversary
does not need to continue her active involvement. She can leave the network and
yet Alice and Bob will no longer be able to have successful communication.
There should be a mechanism to help Alice and Bob resynchronize after having
waited for a sufficiently long period of time for a new ai or bi. Otherwise, the
protocol cannot be resumed and recoverability is lost. One way to perform this
resynchronization is to utilize the authenticated channel occasionally. The advan-
tage of this solution is that it is very simple. However, the authenticated channel
is expensive and it may not be practical to assume that it is accessible after the
initialization phase. For instance, the devices may be widely dispersed, and it may
not be possible to collect them again to perform this kind of resynchronization.
Furthermore, periodic employment of the resynchronization process, according to a
predefined schedule, will not be based on the dynamics of the network. For instance,
some devices may be more active than others or there may be more noise present
in some parts of the network compared to other parts of the network. Indeed, there
is more disruption caused by noise or communication failure in busier parts of the
network. Hence, resynchronization among some users may be necessary more often
than others. As a result, it is desirable to execute the resynchronization process
when it is needed according to the state of the network. We propose the following
protocol to overcome these shortcomings. We use the same hash function, H, used
by Lucks et al. and write Hj, j ≥ 1, to denote the case when the hash function H
is applied j times iteratively.
4.3 An Improved MRP with Resynchronization
Process
The internal state of Alice and Bob includes:
• iA and iB, counters pointing to the position of Alice and Bob in their respec-
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tive hash chains,
• iacceptA, a counter kept by Alice which is the smallest index such that Alice
has accepted the key biacceptA in session iacceptA. Similarly, iacceptB, a counter
kept by Bob which is the smallest index such that Bob has accepted the key
aiacceptB in session iacceptB.
Alice executes the protocol as follows:
• Let i := iA and jA := iacceptA − iA;
• Wait for mi (possibly from Eve), then
• commit-message(mi, i);
• compute di = MACai(i‖mi);
• send (i‖mi, di);
• wait for a message b′i (supposedly from Bob), then
if HjA(b′i) = biacceptA , (key verification step)
then bi := b
′
i; accept-key(bi); send ai; set iacceptA := i and iA = i− 1;
else initiate the resynchronization process.
Bob executes the protocol as follows:
• Let jB := iacceptB − iB;
• Wait for a message (i′‖m′i′ , di′).
• If i′ = iB, then send bi′ , else initiate the resynchronization process.
• Wait for a message a′i′ (supposedly from Alice), then
if HjB(a′i′) = aiacceptB , (key verification step)
then ai′ := a
′
i′ ; accept-key(ai′); set iacceptB := i




then accept m′i′ as authentic in session i
′;
else initiate the resynchronization process.
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Figure 4.7 illustrates this protocol. Let us first highlight the differences between
this protocol and the protocol of Lucks et al. In the internal states of Alice and Bob,
the session counter i is replaced by iA and iB to incorporate adversarial ability to
manipulate a party to decrement the session counter, as was discussed previously,
and consequently change its position in the hash chain. For the same reason,
i + 1 is changed to iacceptA and iacceptB as the smallest index such that a key has
been accepted by Alice or Bob, respectively. Moreover, ai+1 and bi+1 are replaced
by aiacceptB and biacceptA as the accepted keys. Further, parameters jA and jB are
introduced to deal with the case where iacceptA > iA + 1 or iacceptB > iB + 1,
respectively, due to an adversary’s intrusions. A related modification refers to
the key verification step, where the users may need to apply the hash function
H more than once. In the protocol of Lucks et al., the session counter is not
being transmitted or committed to by either party. However, we require that Alice
commits to iA and transmits it in the first flow. This allows Bob to easily detect any
possible manipulations of the session counter by Eve. Furthermore, we provide a
resynchronization process, allowing Alice and Bob to initiate the resynchronization
process when they do not receive the correct keys. Hence, the adversary can no
longer “trap” them in states A1 or B1, as was explained previously.
Surely, it holds that iA = iB when the adversary has been passive since the
initialization. Moreover, in the case where all flows are safely relayed from the
initialization, Alice and Bob will accept every single key from the other party and
move forward in the hash chain together. Hence, in the ith session, iA = iB = i
and iacceptA = iacceptB = i + 1. In particular, jA = iacceptA − iA = 1 and jB =
iacceptB − iB = 1. However, once the adversary begins sending messages to Alice
and Bob, she is capable of manipulating either party to decrement their session
counter in a bogus session. Hence, Alice and Bob will need to resynchronize to
agree on a mutual position in their respective hash chains, which may result in
jA 6= 1 or jB 6= 1.
Note that this variant is instructing Alice and Bob to initiate resynchronization
whenever a mismatch occurs. Hence, once the adversary initiates a bogus session,
she can no longer continue another bogus session undetected. That is, she can
make Alice and Bob decrement their session counters at most once. Hence, we
have |iA− iB| ≤ 1. In case of an active intrusion, the participants are not supposed
to accept the key Eve sends them and, as a result, the values of iacceptA and iacceptB
are not going to be updated. Consequently, we obtain jA = iacceptA − iA = 2 or
jB = iacceptB − iB = 2.
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Alice Bob
Internal-state= iA and iacceptA Internal-state= iB and iacceptB
Let i := iA and jA := iacceptA − iA Let jB := iacceptB − iB ;
Receive input (mi, Bob) and
commit-message(mi, i)
di = MACai (i‖mi)




If i′ = iB , then send bi′ ,
bi′←−−−−− else initiate resynchronization.
Receive b′i and






let iacceptA := i and iA = i− 1; If HjB (a′i′ ) = aiacceptB , then
else initiate resynchronization accept-key(a′
i′ ) and,
let iacceptB := i
′ and iB := i
′ − 1
else initiate resynchronization.









Figure 4.7: Our Proposed Variant of the Lucks Protocol
In this protocol, the session counter is being transmitted in the first flow. More-
over, Alice commits to this value as part of the message, so the adversary cannot
arbitrarily change it without being detected. This implies that the security proof of
the Lucks et al. protocol will apply to this new variant as well. Furthermore, once
either user realizes that Eve could have manipulated the values, they can initiate a
resynchronization process. This process allows them to agree on a session counter
iA = iB, which indicates the corresponding position of each user in their respective
hash chains.
4.3.1 Resynchronization Process
At some point during the execution of the protocol, either Alice or Bob realizes
the need for resynchronizing with the other party. This may be due to a mismatch
caused by adversarial efforts or just due to some communication failure or noise.
In the resynchronization process, Alice computes
IA := min{i : Alice has revealed ai} − 1
and, similarly,
IB := min{i : Bob has revealed bi} − 1
is computed by Bob. Then, they exchange IA and IB over the insecure channel.
Note that, Eve can change these values, say to I ′A and I
′
B, since they are being sent
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over the insecure channel.
Recall that we are instructing Alice and Bob to resynchronize whenever they
notice a mismatch. This implies that the adversary, or some noise in the channel,
can make them increment their session counters at most once before they try to
resynchronize again. Hence, we have |IA− IB| ≤ 1. This fact alone does not enable
Alice and Bob to detect Eve’s manipulation with IA and IB. However, it makes it
impossible for Eve to choose values for I ′A and I
′
B which are smaller than IA − 1
and IB − 1, respectively. We emphasize that this feature is important here. In the
absence of such a feature, Eve can choose I ′A and I
′
B to be very small and exhaust
the hash chains too quickly. That would constitute a strong denial of service attack
that can be prevented as follows.
Alice checks to make sure |IA − I ′B| ≤ 1 and Bob checks to see if |I ′A − IB| ≤ 1
holds. If either of these do not hold, it means that the adversary is attempting to
intrude while they are trying to resynchronize. If |IA − I ′B| ≤ 1 and |I ′A − IB| ≤
1 hold, then Alice and Bob will let iA := min(IA, I
′
B) and iB := min(I
′
A, IB),
respectively. Figure 4.8 depicts the resynchronization process.
Alice Bob
Find Find




If |IA − I′B | ≤ 1, If |I
′
A − IB | ≤ 1,
then let iA := min(IA, I
′
B) then let iB := min(I
′
A, IB)
else initiate resynchronization. else initiate resynchronization.
Figure 4.8: Resynchronization Process for the Proposed Protocol
Note that an active adversary can always disrupt the synchronization. When
one party realizes this, he or she will call for a resynchronization again. If the
adversary is passive in the resynchronization stage, then IA = I
′
A and IB = I
′
B. As
a result, iA = iB and synchronization is achieved.
However, we will show that intrusions of an active adversary during the resyn-
chronization stage, resulting in iA 6= iB, is going to be detected by either Alice or
Bob. In case of intrusions where |IA − I ′B| > 1 or |I ′A − IB| > 1, the adversary is
detected right away as discussed above. The rest of the intrusions are detected in
the first session of the protocol immediately after the resynchronization, depicted
in Fig 4.9. We show that the adversary is detected unless she has found unrevealed
preimages of particular values in the hash chain. Note that iA and iB cannot differ
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very much, due to the conditions |IA− I ′B| ≤ 1 and |I ′A− IB| ≤ 1. However, we can
prove the same statement even if the difference between iA and iB is not bounded.
Alice Eve Bob
Internal-state= iA Internal-state= iB
commit-message(miA , iA)
iA, miA , diA−−−−−→






aiB−−−−−→ Key verification step
Figure 4.9: The First Execution after the Resynchronization
In order for Eve not to be detected by Bob in the key verification step, she must
replace aiA with aiB . Otherwise, Bob will not accept the key and he will initiate
resynchronization regardless of the values of miB and diB . Similarly, she has to
replace biB with biA , otherwise, she will be detected by Alice. Now, assume that
iA < iB after the resynchronization. Finding a correct value for biA means that
Eve has found a nonempty chain of preimages (biB , biB−1, . . . , biA+1). Similarly, if
iA > iB and the adversary goes undetected, she has found a chain of preimages
(aiA , aiA−1, . . . , aiB+1). Hence, as long as finding preimages of H is a hard task,
the adversary will be detected with high probability. As a result, we obtain the
following theorem.
Theorem 7. Let H be a depth-i second preimage resistant and depth-i preimage
resistant hash function in the protocol of Fig 4.7. Consider a polynomially bounded
adversary who changes the values of IA or IB in the resynchronization process of
Fig 4.8, resulting in iA 6= iB. An undetected such intrusion can only occur with a
negligible probability.
4.4 An Improved MRP with Self-Recoverability
We describe the details of our proposed recognition protocol [GMS08] in this sec-
tion, while the security and recoverability analyses are postponed to Section 4.4.1.
Although this protocol is based on the original protocol proposed by Lucks et al.,
the logic of the instructions of Alice and Bob has changed considerably. Moreover,
the information exchanged between Alice and Bob has changed as well.
Note that each pair of users can execute this protocol. However, there must be
a different pair of hash chains for each pair of communicating users. It is implicitly
assumed that Alice and Bob are the communicating parties in the rest of the paper.
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The initialization phase and the setup of the hash chains are exactly as in the
Lucks protocol. The internal state of Alice includes (along with each variable’s
initial value):
• iA := n− 1: the position of Alice in her chain.
• iacceptA := n: the last index of Bob’s chain that was accepted by Alice.
• bA := bn: the last value of Bob’s chain that was accepted by Alice.
• M := Null: the input message to be authenticated in the current session.
• a one-bit flag, to distinguish the program states A0 and A1.
Similarly, Bob’s internal state is as follows:
• iB := n− 1: the position of Bob in his chain.
• iacceptB := n: the last index of Alice’s chain that was accepted by Bob.
• aB := an: the last value of Alice’s chain that was accepted by Bob.
• e′ := Null: the MAC value received in the current session, supposedly from
Alice.
• M ′ := Null: the message received in the current session, supposedly from
Alice.
• a one-trit flag, to distinguish the program states B0, B1, and B2.
Alice and Bob start in program states A0 and B0. We write commit-message(M, iA)
to indicate that Alice is committing herself to sending the message M to Bob in
session iA. We let T be the maximum amount of time Alice waits to receive a
response from Bob, and vice versa.
A0 is executed as follows:
If iA ≤ 0 then Abort.
Receive input (M) and commit-message(M, iA).
Compute eiA := MACaiA (iA‖M).
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Send [eiA ,M ] to Bob and goto A1.
B0 is executed as follows:
If iB ≤ 0 then Abort.
Wait to receive [e′,M ′], then goto B1.
B1 has the following description:
Send [iB, biB ] to Alice and goto B2.
A1 is performed in the following manner:
Wait at most time T to receive [i′B, b
′].
If [i′B, b
′] is received, then
If i′B = iacceptA and bA = b
′ (Bob has not received the last flow of the
previous session) then
Let N := Null.
Send [iacceptA, aiacceptA , N ] and goto A0.
If i′B = iA and bA = H(b
′) then (Alice and Bob seem to be synchronized.)
Let N := M .
Send [iA, aiA , N ] to Bob.
Let iacceptA := i
′
B, bA := b
′ and iA := iA − 1. (Alice updates her
state.)
goto A0.
else Resend [eiA ,M ] to Bob and goto A1.
If timeout then
Resend [eiA ,M ] to Bob and goto A1.
B2 is performed as follows:
Wait at most time T to receive [i′A, a
′, N ′].
If [i′A, a
′, N ′] is received, then
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If i′A = iB and aB = H(a
′) then (Alice and Bob seem to be synchronized.)





Let iacceptB := i
′
A, aB := a




If timeout, then goto B1.
Figure 4.10 illustrates the main steps of this protocol. For simplicity, the in-
structions on what to do in case one party does not receive any response from the
other party are not included in the figure.
If either Alice or Bob receives a message that they did not expect, they are
going to ignore it. For instance, while Alice is in state A1 and is waiting to receive
a message of the form (iB, b), she is going to ignore messages of the form (M
′) that
request for a new session and correspond to state A0. Analogously, when Bob is in
state B2, he is waiting for a message of type iA, a,N . He is going to ignore messages
of the form e′iA ,M
′ since they correspond to state B0. In general, each party only
acts on received messages that have the expected structure in accordance to their
current program state.
When Alice is waiting in state A1 for Bob to respond, she is set to wait for time
T . If she receives a message i′B, b
′ in time T , then she process it in state A1, and
otherwise, she resends eiA ,M to Bob. Similarly, Bob waits to receive a message
i′A, a
′, N ′, supposedly from Alice, for time T . If he does not receive such a message,
he resends iB, b to Alice.
Note that Eve can block the last flow of Alice, iA, a,N . In this case, Alice has
decremented her state, while Bob is waiting to receive iA, a,N , and possibly resend-
ing iB, biB to remind Alice to send him iA, a,N . However, since Alice has moved her
state to A0, she will ignore Bob’s messages. This may appear to be problematic
since Bob is waiting for Alice. However, once Alice is ready to authenticate a new
message to Bob, she will be in program state A1 again, and communication will
resume.
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Alice Bob
Internal state: iA, iacceptA, bA, M Internal state: iB , iacceptB , aB , e
′, M′
A0: B0:
If iA ≤ 0 then Abort. If iB ≤ 0 then Abort.
Receive (M) and commit-message(M, iA).
Compute eiA := MACaiA
(iA‖M).
Send [eiA , M ].
eiA , M−−−−−−−→ Receive [e′, M′].
A1: B1:
Receive [i′B , b
′].
iB , biB←−−−−−−− Send [iB , biB ].
If i′B = iacceptA and bA = b
′ then
Let N := Null.
Send [iacceptA, aiacceptA , N ] and
goto A0.
If i′B = iA and bA = H(b
′) then
Let N := M . B2:
Send [iA, aiA , N ].
iA, aiA , N−−−−−−−→ Receive [i′A, a
′, N′].
Let iacceptA := i
′
B , bA := b
′
and iA := iA − 1. If i′A = iB and aB = H(a
′) then




else Resend [eiA , M ] and goto A1. Accept(M
′, iB).
else Accept(Null).
Let iacceptB := i
′
A, aB := a
′
and iB := iB − 1.
goto B0.
else goto B1.
Figure 4.10: Our Proposed Message Recognition Protocol (Common Case)
4.4.1 Security of Our New Message Recognition Protocol
In this section, we consider different types of possible attacks against our protocol.
Then, we conclude with a theorem which ensures the security of our protocol.
4.4.1.1 Single-session Attacks
In this section, we consider attacks that are started and completed in a single
session. We assume that Eve has stayed passive all along and she becomes active in
the current session for the first time. In case of a successful attack, Bob will accept
some message M ′ in the same session, where M ′ is not Null and not the message
sent by Alice in that session. Since Eve has been passive before this session, we will
have iA = iB at the start of the session; we let i := iA = iB for ease of reference.
For the same reason, we have iacceptA = iacceptB = i+1. Furthermore, Alice and Bob
will have accepted all the intended keys so far. That is, aB = ai+1 and bA = bi+1.
We now want to exhaustively list all possible single-session attacks. As in Sec-
tion 3.2, we follow the notation of [Geh98] in referring to different orderings of the
flows. In each attack, the adversary sends a flow to either Alice or Bob and receives
a flow in response. This notation labels a flow by A if the recipient is Alice, or by B
when the recipient is Bob. For instance, the following attack scenario corresponds
to the attack type of ABAB:
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• A: Eve sends M to Alice and she responds with eiA ,M .
• B: Eve sends e′,M ′ to Bob and he replies with iB, biB .
• A: Eve sends i′B, b′ to Alice and receives iA, aiA , N from her.
• B: Eve sends i′A, a′, N ′ to Bob.
Recall from Section 3.3.3 that the number of distinct attacks against a three





= 6 in [Geh98]. These attacks are denoted AABB,
ABBA, BABA, ABAB, BBAA, and BAAB. We will look at these different attacks
separately.
One can show that the BABA attack scenario can be reduced to the ABBA
attack. That is, if an adversary Oscar can mount a successful attack of type BABA,
then Eve can use Oscar and succeed in the ABBA attack scenario. Similarly, we
can show that the BAAB and ABBA attack scenarios are reduced to the ABAB
case. It remains to analyze the other three attack scenarios, namely AABB, BBAA,
and ABAB. We will reduce a successful adversary in these attacks to a player who
can mount a depth-i existential forgery or can find depth-i preimages or depth-i
second preimages.
















Figure 4.11: Attack of Type AABB
If i′A 6= iB, Bob will not accept any messages. Since iA = iB = i, Eve has to set
i′A := iA in order to succeed. Moreover, Alice reveals iA and aiA only if b
′ is verified;
that is, if bA = H(b
′) (note that bA = bi+1, as discussed before).
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Eve first interacts with Alice and has to find b′ before seeing biB = bi. This
implies that she has found a preimage of bA = bi+1. This exactly translates to the
notion of i-PR defined in Def. 6.















iA, aiA , N−−−−−−−−−−→
Figure 4.12: Attack of Type BBAA
Alice tries to deceive Bob before she starts interacting with Alice. In order to
succeed, Eve needs to present Bob with an a′ such that aB = H(a
′), without having
seen aiA = ai (note that aB = ai+1, as discussed before). In other words, she is
trying to find a preimage of aB = ai+1. If Eve can successfully find such a preimage,
the she translates to a successful player who finds depth-i preimages, as defined in
Def. 6.
Attack of Type ABAB Depicted in Fig. 4.13 is the ABAB attack.
In this scenario, Eve receives biB = bi before she has to send b
′ to Alice. We
analyze the two cases b′ = bi and b
′ 6= bi separately.
If b′ 6= bi, then it implies that Eve has found a depth-i second preimage of
bA = bi+1.
Otherwise, b′ = bi. Alice will verify b
′ = bi and reveal aiA = ai. Eve now has
two choices. She chooses a′ such that either a′ = aiA or a
′ 6= aiA . If a′ 6= aiA ,
then she has found a depth-i second preimage of ai+1 = aB. On other hand, if
a′ = aiA , then for Eve to succeed, she must set N
′ := M ′ and she must have set
e′ := MACa′(i
′
A‖M ′) before learning a′. That is, Eve has successfully forged a MAC.
This reduces to the notion of depth-i existential forgery defined in Def. 8.
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Figure 4.13: Attack of Type ABAB
As was described in Section 3.2 and, also, earlier in this section, Gehrmann [Geh98]
formally proves that there are only six possible types of single-session attack against
the protocol of Figure 4.10. Here we examine the remaining three attacks: BABA,
BAAB, and ABBA. The BABA attack is reduced to the ABBA attack. Then, the
ABBA attack is reduced to the ABAB attack. Finally, the BAAB attack is also
reduced to the ABAB attack. This concludes the analysis of the six different attack
scenarios.
Reducing the BABA attack to an ABBA attack The ABBA attack sce-
nario, depicted in Fig. 4.14, is as follows:
• A: Oscar sends M to Alice and receives eiA ,M from her.
• B: Oscar sends e′,M ′ to Bob and he sends iB, biB .
• B: Oscar sends i′A, a′, N ′ to Bob.
• A: Oscar sends i′B, b′ to Alice and she replies with iA, aiA , N .
On the other hand, the BABA attack scenario, illustrated in Fig. 4.15, is as
follows:
• B: Oscar sends e′,M ′ to Bob and he sends iB, biB .
• A: Oscar sends M to Alice and receives eiA ,M from her.
• B: Oscar sends i′A, a′, N ′ to Bob.
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iA, aiA , N−−−−−−−−−−→















iA, aiA , N−−−−−−−−−−→
Figure 4.15: Attack of Type BABA
• A: Oscar sends i′B, b′ to Alice and she replies with iA, aiA , N .
These two attack scenarios differ in the order of the first two steps and are
identical otherwise. In the BABA attack scenario, Oscar commits to e′ and M ′
before receiving eiA . Note that knowing eiA could possibly help him in choosing e
′.
On the other hand, Oscar receives iB and biB before sending M . The adversary
knows the value of iB. Moreover, the choice of M is independent of the value of
biB . In other words, knowing biB is not going to help the adversary in choosing M .
Hence, if Oscar can win in the BABA attack scenario by first committing to e′ and
M ′ and then receiving eiA , then he can win the ABBA attack scenario with the
same values M,M ′, and e.
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Reducing the ABBA attack to an ABAB attack Recall the ABAB attack
scenario from Section 4.4.1:
• A: Oscar sends M to Alice and receives eiA ,M from her.
• B: Oscar sends e′,M ′ to Bob and he sends iB, biB .
• A: Oscar sends i′B, b′ to Alice and she replies with iA, aiA , N .
• B: Oscar sends i′A, a′, N ′ to Bob.
The ABBA attack differs from the ABAB attack in the order of the last two
steps. In the ABAB attack, Oscar receives iA, aiA , N from Alice, and then he has to
send i′A, a




whereas in the ABBA attack scenario, Oscar sends i′A, a
′, N ′ before seeing iA, aiA , N .
If Oscar has a winning strategy in the ABBA attack scenario, then using the same
values of i′A, a
′, N ′, he will win the ABAB attack scenario.
Reducing the BAAB attack to an ABAB attack The BAAB attack scenario
is as follows:
• B: Oscar sends e′,M ′ to Bob and he sends iB, biB .
• A: Oscar sends M to Alice and receives eiA ,M from her.
• A: Oscar sends i′B, b′ to Alice and she replies with iA, aiA , N .
• B: Oscar sends i′A, a′, N ′ to Bob.
Figure 4.16 depicts this attack.
The analysis of this case is analogous to that of Section 4.4.1.1. The BAAB
attack scenario differs from the ABAB attack scenario in the order of the first two
steps. In the BAAB attack scenario, Oscar has to commit to e′ and M ′ before
seeing eiA . Although Oscar receives iB and biB before sending M , these values
are independent of the choice of M . That is, seeing biB is not going to help the
adversary in choosing M . Hence, a winning strategy in the BAAB attack scenario
reduces to a winning strategy in the ABAB attack scenario.
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Figure 4.16: Attack of Type BAAB
4.4.1.2 Multi-session Attacks
Having ruled out the possibility of single-session attacks, we now turn our attention
to multi-session attacks. Consider attack scenarios which occur over two or more
sessions. In such a case, the adversary becomes active in one session and concludes
her attack in one of the following sessions. In case of a successful attack, Bob
will accept M ′ in the last session of the attack, where M ′ is not Null and not the
message sent by Alice in that session.
Just before Eve becomes active, similar to the single-session attack scenario
discussed above, we must have iA = iB and iacceptA = iacceptB = iA + 1. We again
let i := iA = iB for ease of reference. Moreover, all of the intended keys will have
been accepted to this point, so as a result, aB = ai+1 and bA = bi+1.
We now assume that during session i, Eve becomes active by initiating a flow
with either Alice or Bob, or changing the information sent by them. Since we are
considering multi-session attacks, the attack should not entirely take place in one
session. As a result, Eve is not making Bob accept her message M ′ immediately
after she becomes active. The following three cases can happen once Eve becomes
active:
Case 1. Bob is not engaged right away. That is, Eve first interacts with Alice.
Case 2. Bob is engaged right away and he outputs the message M , sent by Alice.
Case 3. Bob is engaged right away and he outputs Null.
We discuss each case separately.
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Case 1. Let us assume that Eve first interacts with Alice and does not engage Bob. In
order for Alice to conclude her session, she must receive i′B, b
′ such that i′B = i
and bi+1 = H(b
′). Otherwise, Alice will detect that something is going on,
hence, she will not reveal i, ai and, instead, will resend ei,M . If Eve wants
to remain undetected and be able to continue with her attack, she needs to
send i′B, b
′ such that i′B = i and bi+1 = H(b
′). This means that Eve has found
a depth-i preimage of bi+1.
Case 2. Now assume that Bob is engaged and he outputs the message M , sent by
Alice. That is, on input (M), Alice has sent ei,M to Bob. Since Bob accepts
M at the end, it means that he, indeed, has received M in the first flow.
Moreover, for Bob to accept M , he must receive i′A, a
′, N ′ such that i′A = i,
ai+1 = H(a
′), and N ′ = M . There are three different cases to consider here.
– Not having received i, ai,M from Alice, Eve finds i
′
A, a
′, N ′ such that
i′A = i and ai+1 = H(a
′). That is, she finds a depth-i preimage of ai+1.
– Having received i, ai,M from Alice, Eve finds i
′
A, a
′, N ′ such that i′A = i,
ai+1 = H(a
′), and ai 6= a′. That is, she finds a depth-i second preimage
of ai+1.
– Eve sets i′A, a
′, N ′ = i, ai,M . That is, Eve relays Alice’s last flow. Note
that Alice reveals her last flow only if she receives i′B, b
′ such that i′B = i
and bi+1 = H(b
′). There are again three cases to consider here. Either
Eve has found a depth-i preimage of bi+1, she has found a depth-i second
preimage of bi+1, or she has relayed i, b faithfully. In the latter case, Eve
has faithfully relayed all messages, and this does not constitute an attack
by an active adversary. This contradicts our assumption that Eve first
becomes active in session i.
Case 3. Bob is engaged right away and he outputs Null. This means that he has
received and verified i′A and a
′. There are again three cases to consider.
Either Eve has found a depth-i preimage of ai+1, or she has found a depth-i
second preimage of ai+1, or i
′
A and a
′ are the correct i, ai as revealed by Alice.
In this last case, Alice and Bob have successfully remained synchronized, but
were unable to authenticate the messages they intended to authenticate.
The above discussion concludes that in the session immediately after Eve be-
comes active, she can only stop Alice and Bob from authenticating the intended
message, but she cannot bring them out of their synchronized states unless she is
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able to solve the depth-i PR or depth-i SPR problems defined in Definitions 6 and
7. Moreover, if Alice and Bob are synchronized at the beginning of a session, then
they will end the session in a synchronized state, unless Eve is able to find depth-i
preimages or depth-i second preimages.
At the beginning of a multi-session attack, Alice and Bob are synchronized. The
above discussion implies that they remain synchronized until the very last session
of the attack. We can look at this last session of the attack separately and think
of it as a single-session attack. As a result, any multi-session attack translates to a
single-session attack, which were already ruled out in Section 4.4.1.1.
Note that the adversary can only exhaust Alice’s and Bob’s values of the hash
chain one at a time. That is, she can not make them jump more than one step
down the hash chain values.
4.4.1.3 Self-recoverability
In this section, we show that once Eve stops interfering with their message flows,
Alice and Bob will be able to resume successful communication of recognized mes-
sages. Because we have already shown that Alice and Bob remain synchronized in
their i values throughout an active attack by Eve (under the security assumptions
on H and MAC), we need only show that they do not get “trapped” in a program
state, as was the case in the Lucks protocol, for example.
We consider the possible combinations of program states which Alice and Bob
are in when Eve becomes passive. We first consider the case where Alice is in state
A1.
• If Alice is in A1 and Bob is in B0, then after time T , Alice will resend [eiA ,M ]
to Bob, which will cause him to leave state B0, and the protocol will continue.
• If Alice is in A1 and Bob is in B1, then Bob will send [iB, biB ] to Alice and
advance to B2, which will cause her to send an appropriate message to Bob,
and herself return to A0. Bob will return to B0, though he may Accept(Null)
if Eve forged the M ′ which caused Bob to enter the B1 state. This can of
course only affect the first Accept after Eve’s interference, however.
• If Alice is in A1 and Bob is in B2, then Alice will be resending useless
messages to Bob, and staying in A1, but after time T , Bob will return to B1,
and we proceed as above.
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If Alice is in A0, then no progress will be made until the next time she tries to
send a message to Bob. At that point, Alice will enter state A1, and the analysis
continues as above.
4.4.1.4 Main Theorem
The above discussion concludes the discussion of the security and self-recoverability
of the proposed message recognition protocol, and forms the proof of the following
theorem.
Security and Self-recoverability Theorem. A successful adversary against
the protocol of Section 4.4 who efficiently deceives Bob into accepting (M ′,i), where
M ′ is not Null and Alice did not send M ′ in session i, implies an efficient algo-
rithm that finds depth-i preimages or depth-i second preimages, or creates depth-i
existential forgeries. Moreover, the adversary cannot stop Alice and Bob from suc-
cessfully executing the protocol unless she is actively disrupting the communication
for the lifetime of Alice and Bob.
4.5 A New MRP Suitable for Ad Hoc Pervasive
Networks
In this section, we describe the details of a protocol which does not employ any hash
chain technique. The results presented in this section are drawn from the paper
[MS08b]. The initialization phase, execution of the protocol, and the resynchro-
nization process are separately described. The section is concluded by examining
the advantages of using this protocol in comparison to previous designs.
We begin by describing the internal states of Alice and Bob. The internal state
of Alice includes:
• x0 and x1: the passwords for this session and the next session, respectively.
• X0 = H(x0) and X1 = H(x1): the committing hash values of the passwords.
• X0 = H(x0, X1) = H(x0, H(x1)): the binding hash value of the passwords.
• y∗−1, Y ∗0 , Y∗0 : Bob’s most recent password, committing hash value, and binding
hash value accepted by Alice.
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Similarly, the internal state of Bob includes:
• y0 and y1: the passwords for this session and the next session, respectively.
• Y0 = H(y0) and Y1 = H(y1): the committing hash values of the passwords.
• Y0 = H(y0, Y1) = H(y0, H(y1)): the binding hash value of the passwords.
• x∗−1, X∗0 , X ∗0 : Alice’s most recent password, committing hash value, and bind-
ing hash value accepted by Bob.
In this protocol, x0 and y0 are considered to be passwords of the current session.
Similarly, x1 and y1 are the passwords of the next session. We commit to a password
by sending its hash value, so that Eve cannot change it. Further, we bind two
consecutive passwords, in order to detect adversarial intrusions and to be able to
resynchronize in such a case.
Alice performs the initialization phase as follows:
Choose random x0 and x1.
Compute X0 := H(x0), X1 := H(x1), and X0 := H(x0, X1).
Send X0,X0 to Bob over the authenticated channel.
Receive Y0,Y0 from Bob over the authenticated channel.
Let y∗−1 :=⊥, Y ∗0 = Y0, and Y∗0 = Y0.
Similarly, Bob executes the initialization phase according to the following steps:
Choose random y0 and y1.
Compute Y0 := H(y0), Y1 := H(y1), and Y0 := H(y0, Y1).
Receive X0,X0 from Alice over the authenticated channel.
Send Y0,Y0 to Alice over the authenticated channel.
Let x∗−1 :=⊥, X∗0 = X0, and X ∗0 = X0.
The initialization phase of the protocol is depicted in Fig. 4.17. Next, we move
on to the description of the proposed message recognition protocol illustrated in
Fig. 4.18.
On input (m, Bob), Alice’s execution can be described as follows:
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Alice Bob
Choose random x0 and x1 and Choose random y0 and y1 and form
form X0 := H(x0), X1 := H(x1), Y0 := H(y0), Y1 := H(y1),
and X0 := H(x0, X1)
X0,X0
====⇒ and Y0 := H(y0, Y1)
Y0,Y0⇐====
Let y∗−1 :=⊥, Y ∗0 = Y0, Y∗0 = Y0. Let x∗−1 :=⊥, X∗0 = X0, X ∗0 = X0.
Figure 4.17: Initialization Phase of the New Message Recognition Protocol
Choose a random x2.
Compute X2 := H(x2),X1 := H(x1, X2), and d = MACx0 [m].
Send m, d to Bob and wait to receive y′0, Y
′
1 ,Y ′1 from Bob. Resend m, d if Bob
did not respond.






1) = Y∗0 , then send (x0, X1,X1) to Bob and update






1 , Y∗0 := Y ′1, x0 := x1, x1 := x2, X0 := X1,
X1 := X2, and X0 := X1. Otherwise, initiate resynchronization with Bob.
Bob, on the other hand executes the protocol in the following manner:
After receiving m′, d′, choose a random y2.
Compute Y2 := H(y2) and Y1 := H(y1, Y2).
Send y0, Y1,Y1 to Alice and wait to receive x′0, X ′1,X ′1. Resend y0, Y1,Y1 to
Alice if Alice did not respond.






1) = X ∗0 , and d′ = MACx′0 [m
′], then update






1, X ∗0 := X ′1, y0 := y1, y1 := y2, Y0 :=
Y1, Y1 := Y2, and Y0 := Y1, and output (Alice, m′). Otherwise, initiate
resynchronization with Alice.
In case of no adversarial intrusion or communication failure, all the conditions
verify and Alice and Bob will not initiate a resynchronization process. When they
realize that one of the conditions does not hold, they suspect a communication
failure or a possible adversarial intrusion. Hence, they need to resynchronize in
order to make sure they have the correct commitment and binding hash values.
The synchronization process is illustrated in Fig. 4.19. Bob sends y0, Y1,Y1 to Alice
89
Chapter 4. Message Recognition Protocols
§4.5. A New MRP Suitable for Ad Hoc Pervasive Networks
Internal-state of Alice: Internal-state of Bob:
x0, x1, X0, X1, X0, y∗−1, Y ∗0 ,Y∗0 . y0, y1, Y0, Y1, Y0, x∗−1, X∗0 ,X ∗0 .
Alice Bob
Receive input (m, Bob)
Choose a random x2 and form
X2 := H(x2),X1 := H(x1, X2).
Compute d = MACx0 [m].
m, d
−−−−−−−→ Receive m′, d′.




y0, Y1,Y1←−−−−−−− Y2 := H(y2),Y1 := H(y1, Y2).






1) = Y∗0 ,
then send (x0, X1,X1) and
x0, X1,X1−−−−−−−→ Receive x′0, X′1,X ′1.













1 , Y∗0 := Y ′1, and d′ = MACx′0 [m
′],
x0 := x1, x1 := x2, then update your internal state:
X0 := X1, X1 := X2, X0 := X1. x∗−1 := x′0, X∗0 := X′1, X ∗0 := X ′1,
else initiate resynchronization. y0 := y1, y1 := y2,
Y0 := Y1, Y1 := Y2, Y0 := Y1,
and output (Alice, m′).
else initiate resynchronization.
Figure 4.18: New Message Recognition Protocol
and Alice sends x0, X1,X1 to Bob. Note that Alice should already have y0, Y1 and
she is verifying if they match with what she has. Similarly, Bob is verifying if
x0, X1 match with what he has. However, the values of X1 and Y1 are new. It
is possible for the adversary to make either Alice or Bob compute a binding hash
value in a bogus session. In that case, the binding hash value is refreshed. Note
that the resynchronization process is not symmetrical. This is due to the fact that
Bob may detect an intrusion after Alice has updated her state. In this case, the
values x0, X1,X1 that Alice sends during the resynchronization process need to be
verified differently.
Since we are not using a hash chain, the memory requirement on the devices
is relaxed. The octuple (x0, x1, X0, X1,X0, y∗−1, Y ∗0 ,Y∗0 ) is all Alice needs to com-
municate with Bob (she will need another octuple for each different user). In the
previous protocols, the devices had to deal with a hash chain for every single de-
vice they wanted to communicate with. Storing all the values of a hash chain, for
example a0, a1, . . ., an, is too demanding for low-end devices. On the other hand,
storing only the root value of the hash chain, for instance a0, requires too many
computations at each session. The alternative is to employ a time-storage trade-off
and store some of the hash values, see, for example, [CJ03]. Still, there are some
storage and computational requirements associated with this implementation. Our
proposal for not having to deal with a hash chaining technique avoids any memory
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Internal-state of Alice: Internal-state of Bob:
x0, x1, X0, X1, X0, y∗−1, Y ∗0 ,Y∗0 . y0, y1, Y0, Y1, Y, x∗−1, X∗0 ,X ∗0 .
Alice Bob
Choose a random x2 and form Choose a random y2 and form





x0, X1,X1−−−−−−−→ Receive x′0, X′1,X ′1.















then Y∗0 := Y ′1, then X ∗0 := X ′1,






1) = X ∗0 ,






1, X ∗0 := X ′1.
else initiate resynchronization.
Figure 4.19: The Resynchronization Process
or computational requirement of this nature for every session.
Moreover, the passwords are set to be chosen at random in each session. Hence,
they are independent of one another and are refreshed in each session. As a result,
we do not need to consider assumptions that depend on the number of sessions the
protocol is executed. Consequently, the security does not weaken as the protocol
is executed over time.
Furthermore, the devices can run this protocol as many times as they want and
the total number of sessions is not fixed. This provides extra flexibility compared
to the protocols based on the hash chain technique. Next, we look at the security
assumptions relevant for this new protocol.
4.5.1 Security Assumptions
In this section, we define new notions of hash function security, namely Paired
Preimage Resistance (PPR), Paired Second Preimage Resistance (PSPR),
Binding Unforgeability (BU), and Binding Preimage Resistance (BPR).
Each notion is presented as a game between a player Oscar and a Challenger. Note
that these assumptions are independent of the number of times the protocol has
been executed. In other words, in contrast to the approach taken by Lucks et al.
[LZWW05], where they have to assume “depth-i non-invertibility”, “depth-i second
preimage resistance”, “depth-i unforgeability”, and “depth-i combined security” for
every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we only require four assumptions.
The PPR notion is depicted in Fig. 4.20. We note that the PPR property
is analogous to the notion of “depth-2 non-invertibility” defined by Lucks et al.
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Oscar Challenger
Choose random y0 and y1 and form
Y0 := H(y0) and Y0 := H(y0, Y1).
Y0,Y0←−−−−−






Eve wins if Y0 = H(y′0) and Y0 = H(y′0, Y ′1).
Figure 4.20: Paired Preimage Resistance
[LZWW05]. Furthermore, this one assumption is replacing a whole family of as-
sumptions, termed “depth-i non-invertibility”, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Oscar Challenger
Choose random x0 and x1 and form
X1 := H(x1).
x0, X1←−−−−−
Find x′0 and X
′
1, such that




Eve wins if H(x0) = H(x′0) and
H(x0, X1) = H(x′0, X
′
1).
Figure 4.21: Paired Second-preimage Resistance
Figure 4.21 illustrates the PSPR notion. This notion is analogous to “depth-2
second preimage resistance” defined by Lucks et al. [LZWW05]. It is replacing the
family of assumptions termed “depth-i second preimage resistance”, for i, 1 ≤ i ≤
n.
Oscar Challenger
Choose random x0, x1, x2 and and form
X0 := H(x0), X1 := H(x1), X2 := H(x2),
X0 := H(x0, X1) and X1 := H(x1, X2) .
X0,X0←−−−−−−
m−−−−−−→ Compute d = MACx0 [m].
d←−−−−−−
Choose m such that m 6= m′.
m′, d′
−−−−−−→ Eve wins if d′ = MACx0 [m′].
Figure 4.22: Binding Unforgeability
The notion of BU is depicted in Fig. 4.22. Analogous to this notion, Lucks et al.
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[LZWW05] define “depth-2 unforgeability”. Note that the BU notion is replacing
a family of assumptions termed “depth-i unforgeability”, for i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
In Section 4.5.2, we will see that the BU, PPR, and PSPR notions prevent at-
tacks that start and finish during one session. Moreover, attack scenarios spanning
over two sessions are also analyzed, and the BPR notion illustrated in Fig. 4.23 is
associated with these attacks.
Oscar Challenger
Choose random y0, y1, y2 and and form
Y ∗0 := H(y0), Y1 := H(y1),Y2 := H(y2),
Y ∗0 ,Y∗0←−−−−−− Y∗0 := H(y0, Y1), and Y1 := H(y1, Y2).
Y∗0 6= (Y∗0 )′
(Y∗0 )′−−−−−−→
y0, Y1,Y1←−−−−−−
Y ′1−−−−−−→ Eve wins if H(y0, Y ′1) = (Y∗0 )′.
Figure 4.23: Binding Preimage Resistance
Next, we prove the security of our protocol, based on the assumption that the
PPR, PSPR, BU, and BPR games are hard to win.
4.5.2 Security of the Proposed Recognition Protocol
Recall that the goal of the adversary is to make Bob accept a message m′ that was
never sent from Alice. A successful attack is where that Bob is deceived and he
outputs (Alice, m′).
Let (x0, x1, X0, X1,X0, y∗−1.Y ∗0 ,Y∗0 ) and (y0, y1, Y0, Y1,Y0, x∗−1, X∗0 ,X ∗0 ) be the in-
ternal states of Alice and Bob, respectively. Now, assume that Eve, having been
passive all along, mounts a successful attack for the first time and Bob actually
outputs (Alice, m′), where m 6= m′. Since, Eve had been passive before this at-
tack, we can assume that y∗−1 = y0, Y
∗
0 = H(y0) = Y0,Y∗0 = Y0 = H(y0, H(y1)),
x∗−1 = x0, X
∗
0 = X0 = H(x0), and X ∗0 = X0 = H(x0, H(x1)). Eve may complete
her attack in one session, or she may mount an attack that spans more than one
session. First, we examine one-round attacks.
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4.5.2.1 One-session Attacks
In order to exhaustively list all possible one-round attacks against our protocol,
similar to Sections 3.4 and 4.4.1.1, we use the notation of Gehrmann [Geh98] in
labelling different orderings of the flows. Recall, we label each flow sent by the
adversary by A, if the recipient is Alice, and by B, when the recipient is Bob. For
example, an ordering of ABAB corresponds to the following attack scenario:
• A: Eve sends m to Alice and Alice responds with m, d.
• B: Eve sends m′, d′ to Bob and Bob replies with y0, Y1,Y1.
• A: Eve sends y′0, Y ′1 ,Y ′1 to Alice and receives x0, X1,X1 from her.
• B: Eve sends x′0, X ′1,X ′1.





= 6 possible attacks, namely AABB,
ABBA, BABA, ABAB, BBAA, and BAAB. Next, we will analyze each of these
attack scenarios.
We prove that the BABA attack scenario can be reduced to the ABBA attack.
In other words, if the adversary can mount a successful attack of type BABA, then
she also succeeds in the ABBA attack scenario. Similarly, one can show that the
BAAB and ABBA attack scenarios can be reduced to the ABAB case. Hence, it
remains to investigate the AABB, BBAA, and ABAB attack scenarios. We prove
that the AABB, BBAA, and ABAB attacks are not possible by reducing them to
the PPR, PSPR, or PCR games. Then, we show the aforementioned reductions.
Attack of Type AABB. The attack of type AABB is illustrated in Fig. 4.24. In
this attack scenario, Eve finishes her interactions with with Alice before she starts
her interactions with Bob. In other words, Eve has to first deceive Alice in order
to get her to reveal the information she needs to then deceive Bob.
If Eve successfully deceives Alice, then she receives (x0, X1,X1). Now, Eve com-
putes d′ = MACx0 [m
′], for m′ of her choice. She then sends m′, d′ to Bob. Finally,
she completes her attack with setting (x′0, X
′
1,X ′1) = (x0, X1,X1) and sending it to
Bob.
In order to deceive Alice, Eve has to find y′0 and Y
′
1 such that Y0 = H(y
′
0)
and Y0 = H(y′0, Y ′1), where Y0 and Y0 were transmitted in the session immediately
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Figure 4.24: Attack of Type AABB
has been accepted by Alice. This is exactly the problem of PPR, depicted in Fig.
4.20.
Attack of Type BBAA. The attack of type BBAA is illustrated in Fig. 4.25. In
this scenario, Eve interacts with Alice after she has finished interacting with Bob.
That is, she receives (y0, Y1,Y1) from Bob before she has to choose (y′0, Y ′1 ,Y ′1). If
she chooses (y′0, Y
′
1 ,Y ′1) such that (y0, Y1) 6= (y′0, Y ′1) and remains undetected by
Alice, then, Eve can be reduced to a successful player against the PSPR game of




1) and Y1 6= Y ′1 in Section
4.5.2.2. The only remaining case is that, having received (y0, Y1,Y1) from Bob, Eve
lets (y′0, Y
′















1 ,Y ′1←−−−−−−−−−− A
x0, X1,X1−−−−−−−−−−→
Figure 4.25: Attack of Type BBAA
A successful attack of this type implies that Bob has accepted m′. That is, not
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1. Once Eve finds the appropriate x
′
0 and
X ′1, she can compute d
′ = MACx′0 [m
′], for an m′ of her choice. Note that Eve has
received X0 and X0 from the previous session. Now, she has to find x′0, X ′1 such
that X0 = H(x
′
0) and X0 = H(x′0, X ′1). This translates to the notion of PPR if we
replaces each x value by its corresponding y value.
Attack of Type ABAB. Figure 4.26 illustrates the attack of type ABAB. In
this attack, Eve receives the correct (y0, Y1,Y1) from Bob before she has to send
(y′0, Y
′
1 ,Y ′1) to Alice. As it was discussed in the case of the BBAA attack, Eve will
be detected by Alice unless she sets (y′0, Y
′
1 ,Y ′1) = (y0, Y1,Y1). This way Alice will
not detect Eve and she will reveal (x0, X1,X1). The adversary has two choices now.
She either sets (x′0, X
′























Figure 4.26: Attack of Type ABAB
Let us first consider the case where (x′0, X
′
1) = (x0, X1). In this case, the ad-
versary has collected (X0,X0) from previous session. She then sends m to Alice
and Alice replies with (m, d). She will then send (m′, d′) to Bob. At this point the
rest of the flows are determined to be the following: She receives (y0, Y1,Y1) from
Bob, sets (y′0, Y
′
1 ,Y ′1) = (y0, Y1,Y1), and sends it to Alice. Further, she receives
(x0, X1,X1) from Alice, lets (x′0, X ′1,X ′1) = (x0, X1,X1), and sends it Bob. Hence,
this case is exactly the notion of BU depicted in Fig. 4.22.
The second case is when (x′0, X
′
1) 6= (x0, X1). Assume that Eve can mount
a successful attack of type ABAB with (x′0, X
′
1) 6= (x0, X1). That is, she has
collected X0,X0 from previous session. She chooses m and receives d such that
d = MACx0 [m]. Then, she submits m
′, d′. Finally, she receives x0, X1 and she is
supposed to send x′0, X
′




1) 6= (x0, X1), H(x0) = H(x′0), H(x0, X1) =
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′ = MACx′0 [m
′]. We reduce Eve to a successful player against the
Challenger of PSPR game, depicted in Fig. 4.21. The reduction is illustrated in
Fig. 4.27.
Eve Oscar Challenger
Choose random x0 and x1
Let X0 := H(x0)
x0, X1←−−−−−− and form X1 := H(x1).
and X0 := H(x0, X1).
X0,X0←−−−−−−











Oscar wins if H(x0) = H(x′0)
and H(x0, X1) = H(x′0, X
′
1).
Figure 4.27: Reducing Eve to a Player Against the Challenger of PSPR
Note that, Oscar is playing against the Challenger of PSPR and at the same
time he is playing the role of both Alice and Bob against Eve.
We continue by reducing the BABA attack to the ABBA attack. Further, we
reduce the ABBA attack to the ABAB attack that was analyzed in Section 4.5.2.
Finally, the only remaining attack scenario, BAAB, is also reduced to the ABAB
attack. This concludes the analysis of the six different attack scenarios.
Reducing BABA attack to ABBA attack. The attack of type ABBA is
depicted in Fig. 4.28, and Fig. 4.29 illustrates the attack of Type BABA.
These two attacks differ only in the order of the first two steps. The ABBA
attack is as follows:
• A: Oscar sends m to Alice and she responds with m, d.
• B: Oscar sends m′, d′ to Bob and he replies with y0, Y1,Y1.
• B: Oscar sends x′0, X ′1,X ′1.
• A: Oscar sends y′0, Y ′1 ,Y ′1 to Alice and receives x0, X1,X1 from her.
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1 ,Y ′1←−−−−−−−−−− A
x0, X1,X1−−−−−−−−−−→















1 ,Y ′1←−−−−−−−−−− A
x0, X1,X1−−−−−−−−−−→
Figure 4.29: Attack of Type BABA
The BABA attack has the following order:
• B: Oscar sends m′, d′ to Bob and he replies with y0, Y1,Y1.
• A: Oscar sends m to Alice and she responds with m, d.
• B: Oscar sends x′0, X ′1,X ′1.
• A: Oscar sends y′0, Y ′1 ,Y ′1 to Alice and receives x0, X1,X1 from her.
Note that in the BABA attack scenario, the choice of m is independent of what
the values of y0, Y1 and Y1 are. That is, knowing y0, Y1,Y1 before choosing m is not
going to help Oscar. On the other hand, he is committing himself to m′, d′ before
receiving any values, such as d, that could possibly help him. If Oscar wins by first
choosing m′, d′ and then receiving d in the BABA attack scenario, then he can also
win the ABBA attack by using the same values m,m′, and d′.
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Reducing ABBA attack to ABAB. Recall the ABAB attack described in
Section 4.5.2:
• A: Eve sends m to Alice and she responds with m, d.
• B: Eve sends m′, d′ to Bob and he replies with y0, Y1,Y1.
• A: Eve sends y′0, Y ′1 ,Y ′1 to Alice and receives x0, X1,X1 from her.
• B: Eve sends x′0, X ′1,X ′1.
This attack differers from the ABBA attack in the order of the last two steps.
In the ABAB attack, Eve first receives x0, X1,X1 from Alice, then she has to send
x′0, X
′
1,X ′1 to Bob. Whereas in the case of the ABBA attack, Oscar has to send
x′0, X
′
1,X ′1 to Bob before he receives x0, X1,X1 from Alice. If Oscar has a winning
strategy in the ABBA attack, the Eve can use him in her ABAB attack by sending
the same values of x′0, X
′
1,X ′1 that Oscar sends to Bob.


















Figure 4.30: Attack of Type BAAB
Recall that knowing y0, Y1,Y1 before choosing m is not going to help Oscar.
Moreover, in the BAAB attack, Oscar is first committing himself to m′, d′. If Oscar
wins the BAAB attack by first choosing m′, d′ and then receiving d, then so will
Eve in the ABAB attack, by just using the same values m,m′, and d′.
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4.5.2.2 Multi-session Attacks
Now consider attack scenarios which span two or more sessions. The adversary
is active but remains undetected in all sessions of the attack. She then submits
her message in the last session of the attack. If she tampers with y0, Y1, x0, or X1
and remains undetected, then we go back to the cases described above. Hence, it
remains to examine the cases when she changes the binding hash values. We look
at the case where Eve changes the value of Y1 to Y ′1. The case where Eve alters X1
to X ′1 is analogous due to the symmetry of the protocol structure.
Assume that Eve changes Y1 to Y ′1 and does not touch y0 or Y1. She goes
undetected in this session because Alice verifies y0 and Y1, but only records Y ′1
without verification. She then updates her state as follows y∗−1 := y0, Y
∗
0 := Y1,
(Y∗0 )′ := Y ′1.
In the next session, Alice sends (y0, Y1,Y1) and Eve has to change it to an
appropriate (y′0, Y
′
1 ,Y ′1) to remain undetected. Otherwise, Alice will call for resyn-






1) = (Y∗0 )′. We treat
the two cases y0 = y
′
0 and y0 6= y′0 separately.
If H(y′0) = Y
∗
0 and y0 6= y′0, then Eve, having seen y0, has found y′0 such that
H(y′0) = H(y0). This means that Eve has found a second preimage of y0.
On the other hand, when y0 = y
′




0 holds. Then, Alice
verifies to see if H(y0, Y
′
1) = (Y∗0 )′. If it holds, then Eve is a successful player in the
BPR game of Fig. 4.23.
If the adversary were to mount an attack that spans over more than two rounds,
she would have to successfully pass the second round. However, the above discussion
shows that the adversary can only pass the second session without being detected
if she can win the BPR game or SPR game.
4.5.2.3 The Security Theorem
We investigated all possible attacks against the message recognition protocol of Fig.
4.18 by considering two different cases, namely if the attack is taking place over
one session, or if it spans more than one session. We examined these two cases
separately.
In the first case, there are six possible attack scenarios: BABA, BAAB, ABBA,
AABB, BBAA, and ABAB. Attacks of type BABA, BAAB, and ABBA can be
reduced to the ABAB case. Further, we showed that a successful adversary (Eve)
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in attacks of type AABB, BBAA, and ABAB attacks can be reduced to a successful
player (Oscar) in the PPR, PSPR, or BU games.
In the case of attacks that occur over more than one session, we showed that
the successful adversary can be reduced to a successful player against the BPR or
SPR games.
This concludes the analysis of different attack scenarios and proves the following
theorem.
Theorem 8. A successful adversary, who can efficiently deceive Bob in outputting
(Alice, m′), where Alice never sent m′, implies an efficient algorithm in winning
PPR, PSPR, BU, or BPR hash function games.
This theorem precisely identifies the required properties for a hash function to
be used in the message recognition protocol of Fig. 4.18. There is no concrete
construction of such a hash function. However, no one knows how to prove that
a concrete construction of a hash function has any non-trivial property. It is a
standard approach taken in the literature to assume some properties for an idealized
hash function and to prove security of a given protocol assuming these assumptions.
Note that the same approach was taken by Lucks et al. [LZWW05]. One can
analyze these games in the random oracle model and compare their hardness to
more standard hash function security notions, see for example Sections 2.3.2.
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5.1 A Summary of the Thesis
We assumed that there are two channels available for communication, one insecure
broadband channel and one authenticated narrow-band channel. We produced
the required formalism needed in a general model of non-interactive Message Au-
thentication Protocols using these two channels. GNIMAP depicts a general non-
interactive Message Authentication Protocol. We proved that GNIMAP is secure
given that a Binding Game is hard to win for an adversary with certain properties.
Further, we examined the NIMAPs found in the literature. We discussed their
security in our general model. We proposed a particular NIMAP based on HCR
hash functions. We proved that our proposed NIMAP is secure in the general model
given that the HCR Game is hard to win.
Our proposed NIMAP, sends the same amount of information over the authen-
ticated channel as the most secure NIMAP proposed so far, while achieving the
same level of security. In comparison with this latter protocol, our NIMAP reduces
the amount of information sent over the insecure channel significantly.
Next, having examined the most secure and efficient IMAP found in the liter-
ature, we proposed a new IMAP based on ICR hash functions, a new notion that
102
Chapter 5. Conclusion and Future Work
§5.1. A Summary of the Thesis
we have defined. Given a secure ICR hash function, we proved that our IMAP is
secure.
Our security assumptions are reasonable and are based on the existence of an
ICR hash function. We do not require any previously distributed public parameters,
which are needed for commitment schemes.
The amount of information sent over the authenticated channel is smaller than
the most secure IMAP proposed so far, while achieving the same level of security.
Allowing the same amount of information to be sent over the authenticated channel,
we can tolerate much stronger adversaries.
Finally, we examined the problem of message recognition. Previous recognition
protocols were revisited and their shortcomings were pointed out. We looked at the
Lucks protocol in more detail and described a situation where the protocol fails to
recover after the adversary’s intrusion. We suggested a variant of this protocol to
overcome this problem. In particular, in case of communication failure or adver-
sarial disruption, this protocol is not equipped with a practical resynchronization
process and can fail to resume. Our proposed variant is equipped with a resynchro-
nization technique that allows users to resynchronize whenever they wish or when
they suspect an intrusion. We have also noted the equivalence of digital signature
schemes with message recovery and non-interactive message recognition protocols.
We further proposed a new message recognition protocol, which is based on
the original protocol by Lucks et al., and which incorporates a resynchronization
technique within itself to provide self-recoverability. That is, the proposed protocol
overcomes the recoverability problem of the Lucks et al. protocol without having
to provide a separate resynchronization procedure. Finally, we formally proved the
security of our protocol.
Last but not least, we proposed a new design for message recognition protocols
suitable for ad hoc pervasive networks. This proposal does not make use of hash
chains. Hash chaining techniques have been used in recent designs of message
recognition protocols. In this approach, the small devices are required to save values
of a hash chain in their memories for every single user they want to communicate
with. Since we do not use this technique, we no longer require the small devices to
save values of a hash chain in their memories. This relaxes the memory requirements
and makes the protocol more suitable for ad hoc networks.
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5.2 Future Work and Outlook
The security of some message authentication protocols is based on computational
assumptions, the hardness of ICR and HCR hash function games, for instance.
The existence of particular instances of secure ICR and HCR hash functions is an
open problem. It is also interesting to propose protocols that are based on other
assumptions that are well-studied, such as collision resistance or second-preimage
resistance. On another note, we have provided a general framework for NIMAPs,
and it would be interesting to see a general model for IMAPs as well. Proposing
a model that encapsulates all the possibilities in the interactive setting of IMAPs
is going to be a harder task when compared to the case of NIMAPs. There are
more possible flow structures in an interactive setting which results in more possible
attack scenarios.
A related direction is to investigate other cryptographic goals, for example mu-
tual key generation in the context of ad hoc networks using two-channel cryptogra-
phy. Mutual key generation happens when both parties contribute random inputs
of their choice to a protocol that generates a key. This allows both parties to en-
sure that the generated key is sufficiently random and hard to predict. It would
be interesting to provide some Diffie-Hellman type protocols achieving mutual key
generation that take advantage of the narrow-band channel. It is important that
these protocols be light-weight in terms of communication bandwidth and memory
requirements.
There are also some interesting problems involving the alternate usages of the
narrow-band channel, the implementation of this channel, and assuming weaker
properties for this channel. In the literature, all applications of the narrow-band
channel happen simultaneously with the use of the broadband channel. However,
one can think of scenarios where using the authenticated flow beforehand is an
advantage. For instance, there are password based schemes for key agreement
protocols. A bidirectional authenticated channel can be used to transmit the short
password to Alice and Bob. In general, one can see if incorporating the manual
channel into any existing protocol will result in some security advantage.
Implementing the narrow-band channel is a significant step in the development
of two-channel cryptography. The early suggestions involved incorporating human
abilities in designing authentication protocols. However, human beings are prone
to error and it is desirable to eliminate the human error factor. Infrared (IR), laser,
near field communication (NFC) developed by Sony and Phillips, or visible light
between the two devices can be used to send a short string. One can also require
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the two devices to physically touch each other. Although using these signals has
the advantage of essentially eliminating the human error factor, there is a cost
associated to equipping the devices with the appropriate signal transmitter and
receiver. Many manufacturing companies may be reluctant to equip their devices
with such transmitters as a result. An alternative to the latter two proposals is
to use hash function chains in implementing the second channel. This approach
eliminates the human error and it is very cost efficient since almost all devices are
equipped with built-in hash functions anyway.
One other point in realization of the narrow-band channel is that, for most
proposals, it is not possible to replay flows over this authenticated channel. The
only exception seems to be voice over IP in which the voice can be recorded by
the adversary and replayed later on to authenticate a different message. For all
other instances, it seems that the adversary cannot replay the flows and hence is
bound to change the communication over the wireless channel in realtime. This will
pose a weakening of adversarial capabilities and will enable researchers to design
protocols which achieve the same level of security and, yet, be more efficient and
based on simpler and weaker security assumptions. That is, they have to transmit
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